WILLIAMSPORT – A Pennsylvania federal judge has ruled that a board-certified urogynecologist who was chosen to be an expert witness in an pelvic device product liability action, may only testify as to his case-specific opinions in the matter and not on the issue of general causation.
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania Judge Matthew S. Brann rendered the decision on June 29, in the matter of Lavore v. Boston Scientific Corporation.
Plaintiff Christine Lavore of Tioga County, N.Y. alleges she sustained serious injuries after being implanted with Boston Scientific’s Obtryx Transobturator Mid-Urethral Sling System device in a Pennsylvania hospital in January 2013.
Lavore then brought suit in July of that same year, alleging multiple counts of negligence, strict liability, breach of warranties, fraudulent concealment and punitive damages against Boston Scientific.
The instant matter was once a part of Multidistrict Litigation No. 2326, which grouped product liability lawsuits against Boston Scientific.
After Lavore’s individual case neared conclusion, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia Judge Joseph R. Goodwin transferred Lavore’s case here “for the convenience of the parties and in order to promote its final resolution.”
Part of that final resolution is a motion from Lavore’s limit or exclude the general and specific causation opinions of Boston Scientific’s expert witness, Dr. Patrick Culligan. Culligan is a board-certified urogynecologist, and Lavore contested his opinions in his submitted expert report dated March 22, 2019.
Brann began by stating Boston Scientific designated Culligan as a case-specific expert, and not as an expert on general causation.
Though Boston Scientific argued that Culligan’s general causation opinions are “necessary to properly convey [his] analysis of Lavore’s complaints” and were “inextricably intertwined” with his case-specific opinions, Brann added Boston Scientific provided no case law to support admission on this basis.
“Judge Goodwin has already ruled, in analyzing other expert testimony, that even if general causation opinions ‘directly relate to and form a reliable basis for’ case-specific opinions, that is not enough to admit general causation opinions from an expert that ‘has been designated as a case-specific expert only.’ This Court agrees with this course of action and finds it helpful in resolving the instant issue before the Court,” Brann stated.
“Because the time for expert disclosure has passed and Dr. Culligan was disclosed only as a specific causation expert, he may not offer general causation testimony. Culligan is permitted to rely on the general causation opinions proffered by experts who are properly designated to offer such opinions when forming his case-specific opinions, but he may not exceed the bounds of his designation by offering these opinions himself.”
Lavore further argued that Culligan’s opinions on case-specific causation were not detailed enough, asserting that his report “lacks the requisite detail” to be considered acceptable under Rule 26(a)(2)(B), a rule pertaining to expert witnesses who provide written reports.
As a result, Lavore asserted Culligan should be excluded from testifying in this case.
“Lavore has made no serious challenge to Culligan’s qualifications. Further, Culligan provides over 10 pages of Lavore’s medical history, which inform Culligan’s opinions as to Lavore. I find that Culligan’s report ‘covers the opinions to be expressed and the basis for the opinions, and provides substantial details about Culligan’s qualifications and experience as a witness,” Brann said.
“Given the limited nature of Lavore’s protestations about Culligan’s case-specific testimony, at this juncture, Lavore’s ‘objections go to the weight, not the admissibility, of Dr. Culligan’s opinion testimony.’ The Court will permit Culligan to introduce his opinions on case-specific causation. Lavore is free to contest and critique Culligan in the arena of cross-examination.”
Brann then granted in part and denied in part Lavore’s motion to limit or exclude.
Therefore, Culligan was excluded from providing expert opinions and testimony on the issue of general causation, while he was likewise not excluded from providing the case-specific opinions and testimony noted in his expert report.
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania case 4:20-cv-00780
From the Pennsylvania Record: Reach Courts Reporter Nicholas Malfitano at nick.malfitano@therecordinc.com