HARRISBURG – The Superior Court of Pennsylvania recently reversed a decision reached by a Berks County court, which had opened a default judgment against an animal sanctuary and transferred rights and title to eight horses, into the hands of a non-party to the original case.
Superior Court judges Anne E. Lazarus, Deborah A. Kunselman and Mary P. Murray ruled on May 7 that litigation between Rivers End Animal Sanctuary and Learning Center, Inc. and Derbe Eckhart would continue in the Berks County Court of Common Pleas, after it opened and vacated an ill-supported motion for default judgment.
Kunselman authored the Court’s opinion.
Rivers End and Learning Center, Inc. had appealed from the order vesting title to a horse in Vera Nederostek, a non-party to this declaratory judgment action. According to Kunselman, the Superior Court did not need to address that order, because in its view, the trial court previously abused its discretion by opening a default judgment against Eckhart, the named defendant.
“Rivers End filed this case asking the court to declare that whatever rights, titles, and interest that Eckhart may have had in nine horses had transferred to Rivers End. Allegedly, on Jan. 13, 2019, Eckhart’s agent transferred to Rivers End any rights, titles, or interests Eckhart may have possessed in those animals,” Kunselman said.
“Rivers End took possession of the nine horses and placed them in 30-day-quarantine facilities. During the quarantine period, Eckhart and his agents contacted the facilities to dispute Rivers End’s ownership and possession. Thus, Rivers End filed this declaratory judgment action to resolve Eckhart’s claim, if any, to the horses.”
Eckhart failed to enter an appearance or to file any pleadings opposing Rivers End’s complaint. The Prothonotary of Berks County therefore entered a default judgment against him on April 2, 2019.
Rivers End also moved for the trial court to enjoin Eckhart and his agents “from claiming or asserting any right, title, or interest in (or to) any of the nine horses [and] transferring all such claims to [Rivers End].”
10 days later, on April 12, 2019, Eckhart filed a petition to open the default judgment and to quash Rivers End’s motion, which did not have preliminary objections or an answer to the complaint attached to it. Without awaiting a reply from Rivers End, the trial court opened the default judgment and quashed Rivers End’s motion.
“The Court never convened a trial or heard oral argument, but, on October 4, 2019, it inexplicably issued two orders that disposed of all claims and all parties. The first order granted Rivers End injunctive relief against Eckhart regarding eight of the horses. It also granted relief Rivers End did not seek, namely, quiet title to the eight horses,” Kunselman said.
“Furthermore, the trial court established itself as trustee of the living chattels by forbidding Rivers End from selling or transferring title to the eight horses without court approval. The second order vested ownership of the ninth horse, Sahara, in a third party, Vera Nederostek.
On appeal, Rivers End asked, “Was it an error of law to open a default judgment, when [Eckhart] did not even try to show a meritorious defense, as is required by Rule of Civil Procedure 237.1(a) and as is required by the three-pronged test?”
The Superior Court concurred with Rivers End’s assessment of the case.
“Rivers End contends Eckhart’s petition to open the default judgment failed to meet the second prong of the test, and that it violated the Rule 237.3 governing such petitions. We agree,” Kunselman said.
“Accordingly, the trial court’s decision to grant Eckhart’s petition was manifestly unreasonable, because there is nothing in his petition that could lead a reasonable person to conclude he had established a meritorious defense or alleged a colorable counterclaim. Eckhart merely stated he believed these unidentified legal theories existed. Unsubstantiated statements of personal beliefs do not establish legal defenses or counterclaims, either in fact or at law. Therefore, the trial court had no rational basis for opening the default judgment.”
Kunselman added the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered that the default judgment against Eckhart be opened, reversed the order entered in favor of Rivers End and vacated all such orders that the trial court entered in this matter.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania case 1848 MDA 2019
Berks County Court of Common Pleas case 19-01701
From the Pennsylvania Record: Reach Courts Reporter Nicholas Malfitano at nick.malfitano@therecordinc.com