PITTSBURGH – A federal judge has denied a financial services group’s motion to dismiss a race and sex discrimination lawsuit filed against it by one of its former employees, and instead converted the defendant’s motion to one for summary judgment.
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania Judge William S. Stickman IV ruled on Dec. 14 that ACA Compliance Group’s action would now be considered a motion for summary judgment, in the lawsuit brought by John E. Coman Jr.
“Coman filed this employment discrimination suit against ACA in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas. Specifically, Coman alleges that ACA, his former employer, discriminated against him on the basis of race (Count I), sex (Count II) and retaliated against him (Count III), in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. He also asserted that ACA’s discriminatory practices violated the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA) (Count IV),” Stickman said.
“ACA removed the case to this Court on the basis of federal-question jurisdiction. ACA then filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Coman failed to exhaust administrative remedies for his race discrimination claims and that he previously released all claims against ACA through a settlement agreement. With respect to exhaustion, the Court will deny ACA’s motion. With respect to the alleged settlement agreement – which depends on material outside the pleadings – the Court will convert ACA’s motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment.”
According to Stickman, Coman’s Charge of Discrimination “is integral to [his] discrimination and retaliation claims because it is a prerequisite to his ability to bring those claims in court.”
“Upon review of the Charge of Discrimination and the complaint, the Court holds that Coman has exhausted administrative remedies for each of his claims. In the timely-filed Charge of Discrimination, Coman checked the boxes for discrimination based on ‘sex’ and ‘retaliation.’ He then gave a short narrative explaining that, between April 29 and May 15, 2020, he ‘was harassed by supervisor because of [his] sex, male,” Stickman said.
“The female supervisor apparently ‘berated’ Coman when he asked for more details about assignments, changed deadlines to force him to work on weekends, sent ‘nasty emails’ to him, and, at one point, said that ‘[his] behavior was typical of an arrogant, entitled, white male.” Coman ‘filed a report with HR,’ but, on May 15, 2020, he was ‘discharged in retaliation for [his] complaints.’ Coman’s complaint reiterates these same allegations, though it provides some additional details about interactions with his supervisor and a few human resources employees.”
Stickman explained that Coman “clearly exhausted administrative remedies for his sex-based discrimination and retaliation claims, and that those claims are ‘fairly within the scope’ of the Charge of Discrimination” and that Coman “not only checked the appropriate boxes for those claims, but he also stated multiple times in the narrative that he was harassed because of his sex and retaliated against for filing a complaint.”
Per Stickman’s rationale, the close connection between Coman’s race and sex discrimination allegations was enough to satisfy the exhaustion requirement.
As to the argument surrounding the supposed settlement agreement, Stickman said it was not valid.
“In support of its motion, ACA has presented a series of emails regarding settlement negotiations between the parties. However, courts may only consider certain extrinsic evidence when evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. The emails do not fall within any of the permissible categories. They were not attached to the complaint, nor were they referenced in the complaint, either explicitly or implicitly. They are not matters of public record. Finally, they do not form the basis of any of Coman’s claims (but rather, only the basis of ACA’s affirmative defense),” Stickman said.
“Nevertheless, the Court recognizes that the emails (and potentially other material beyond the pleadings) are essential to resolving ACA’s defense – that is, the Court cannot determine whether the parties entered into a settlement agreement without considering extrinsic evidence. The Court therefore declines to exclude this extrinsic evidence.”
With respect to the dismissal motion, Stickman converted it to a motion for summary judgment.
“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandate the next step: If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56. All parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.’ In accordance with Rule 12(d), the Court will convert ACA’s motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment and will afford the parties an opportunity to present additional relevant material,” Stickman said.
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania case 2:21-cv-00976
From the Pennsylvania Record: Reach Courts Reporter Nicholas Malfitano at nick.malfitano@therecordinc.com