PHILADELPHIA – A Pennsylvania state trooper has denied that he illegally subjected a Chester County man to detainment, search, arrest and a blood test for DUI without probable cause.
Byron Quinn-Winne of Oxford first filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on May 27, 2020 versus the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania State Trooper Christopher F. Tustin and Pennsylvania State Police Commissioner Robert Evanchick.
Winne said he was traveling southbound on Interstate 95 in Delaware County on May 28, 2018 when Tustin pulled him over for a traffic stop and asked for his driver’s license, vehicle registration and vehicle insurance card, which he provided.
“Trooper Tustin then ordered plaintiff out of the vehicle and patted him down, which yielded negative results. Trooper Tustin then called for a backup K-9 unit which proceeded to search plaintiff’s vehicle. The vehicle search yielded negative results for narcotics, firearms or some other contraband,” the suit stated.
“Following the search, without conducting a field sobriety test, Trooper Tustin placed plaintiff in handcuffs and had him transported to Riddle Hospital for a DUI blood test. Plaintiff was detained at the hospital for several hours, then released after the blood test. Despite being detained, searched and arrested, then subjected to a DUI blood test, plaintiff was never formally charged with a crime. There was clearly no legal cause to justify the detention and arrest of plaintiff.”
The lawsuit alleged Tustin “failed to take reasonable steps to investigate and pursue information that would have indisputably negated any such legal cause” and pointed to the state and Evanchick as policymaker and implementer of practices, procedures and customs used to train Pennsylvania state troopers.
Nearly 18 months later, the Commonwealth defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim on Nov. 10, 2021.
“The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over any claim against the Commonwealth for alleged violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments as well as the Sections 1981 and 1983 claims contained in Count II. Absent consent by the State, the Eleventh Amendment bars suits in federal court by a private party against states, state agencies and state officials in their official capacities,” the dismissal motion stated, in part.
“Plaintiff sues the Commonwealth, a sovereign governmental unit. None of the exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity apply to this case. Section 1983 does not abrogate immunity and the Commonwealth has not waived immunity or consented to this action. Moreover, there is no private right of action for damages against state actors under 42 U.S.C. Section 1981, which only applies to private actors.”
Furthermore, the motion said that the plaintiff failed to state a plausible claim against Evanchick and the Commonwealth.
“Regardless of whether Commissioner Evanchick theoretically can be sued in his individual capacity under a Monell-like theory for a subordinate’s alleged constitutional violations, here he has been sued solely as an agency head under a respondeat superior theory – which is not permissible. A supervisor can be held liable for the acts of a subordinate only if she knows that the subordinate is violating someone’s rights and fails to act to stop the subordinate from doing so,” the motion added.
“No such allegation exists in the complaint. Instead, plaintiff merely alleges that the Commissioner knew of citizens’ ‘clearly established’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Such generalized knowledge has nothing to do with whether plaintiff can establish if Commissioner Evanchick knew Trooper Tustin was violating Quinn-Winne’s rights on May 28, 2018 and whether the Commissioner failed to stop the trooper from doing so. Further, it is well-established that a supervisory official has no affirmative duty under Section 1983 to take action against an offending subordinate after the fact.”
On March 14, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania Judge Michael M. Baylson ordered the dismissal of several claims associated with the case.
“Both plaintiff and defendants agree that plaintiff’s claims against the Commonwealth are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and plaintiff has requested to withdraw these claims. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss all claims against the Commonwealth. Plaintiff asserts that his claims against Commissioner Evanchick are brought pursuant to the Monell doctrine. As an initial matter, it is an unsettled question in the Third Circuit whether a state official, as distinct from a municipal official, who is sued in their individual capacity can be held liable on a Monell theory,” Baylson said.
“Assuming, arguendo, that a state official can be held liable on a Monell theory, plaintiff has nonetheless failed to state a Monell claim. Plaintiff’s allegations regarding Commissioner Evanchick are vague, conclusory, and amount to a boilerplate recitation of the elements of a Monell claim. Detailed facts as to the alleged policy, practice, or custom must be stated. The Court will therefore dismiss all claims against Commissioner Evanchick, without prejudice.”
As to the state law intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against Tustin, Baylson stated that “because Trooper Tustin was acting within the scope of his duties, plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is barred.”
Baylson then dismissed the claim, without prejudice.
UPDATE
Tustin’s counsel filed an answer with affirmative defenses on March 30.
In the answer, Tustin admitted to conducting field sobriety tests on the plaintiff before placing him in handcuffs and before transporting him to the hospital, that the “K-9 search” did not occur until after he conducted said tests and that he brought the plaintiff to the hospital for blood testing and that he was not released until after the test concluded.
In nearly all other respects, Tustin’s counsel denied the plaintiff’s assertions.
“Defendant Trooper Tustin is entitled to qualified immunity. To the extent a portion of Count I is based on state law, sovereign immunity bars any and all claims brought by plaintiff under state law. At all material times, defendant Tustin performed his duties in good faith. At all material times, defendant Tustin’s actions were privileged under Pennsylvania law. Plaintiff failed to mitigate his damages, if any,” per the answer’s affirmative defenses.
For counts of civil rights violations for unreasonable detention, false arrest, false imprisonment, policies and procedures in violation of the 4th and 14th Amendments and intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff is seeking compensatory damages from all defendants, punitive damages from defendant Tustin, attorney’s fees and costs, other and further relief as may appear just and appropriate, plus a trial by jury.
The plaintiff is represented by Earl D. Raynor Jr. in Philadelphia.
The defendants are represented by Matthew R. Skolnik of the Pennsylvania Attorney General’s Office, also in Philadelphia.
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania case 2:20-cv-02493
From the Pennsylvania Record: Reach Courts Reporter Nicholas Malfitano at nick.malfitano@therecordinc.com