PITTSBURGH – A Black former employee of Allegheny County’s Department of Human Services has maintained her claims that it retaliated against and fired her from her role within the department, in response to her reporting alleged discrimination tactics against her.
Kameka Walters of Allegheny County first filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania on July 22 versus the Allegheny County Department of Human Services, of Pittsburgh.
“Plaintiff was employed by the defendant from on or about June 8, 2009, until her constructive discharge on or about July 19, 2021. At the time of the plaintiff’s constructive discharge, she held the position of Peer Coach. In or about 2019, plaintiff filed an internal complaint with the defendant’s Human Resources Department against her supervisor, Karen Rohley. Plaintiff complained of discrimination on the basis on her race, African-American. Thereafter, plaintiff was not promoted to the position of Head Coach. Similarly-situated Caucasian employees were promoted to the position of Head Coach by the defendant within one year of becoming a Peer Coach,” the suit said.
“In or about 2020, after the plaintiff returned from maternity leave, representatives of the defendant directed the plaintiff to copy her supervisor on all communications. Similarly-situated Caucasian employees and/or similarly situated employees that did not take maternity leave were not required by the defendant to copy their communications to a supervisor. At that time, defendant also did not permit the plaintiff to go to meetings with caseworkers unless she was accompanied by her manager, Gregory Phillips, Rohley and/or an employee with the position of Head Coach.”
The suit claimed that Walters was discriminated against for being an African-American female and raising these concerns with management.
“In or about 2021, plaintiff applied for a Caseworker Supervisor position. Plaintiff was objectively qualified for that position. Plaintiff was not selected by the defendant for the position as Caseworker Supervisor. Instead, defendant selected eight Caucasian individuals and five African-American individuals for the position of Caseworker Supervisor. When the plaintiff inquired about the non-selection, she was informed that her supervisor indicated that the plaintiff needed to improve on her consistency. Plaintiff believes, and therefore avers, that her supervisor provided this feedback on her job performance based on the plaintiff’s race, African-American, and/or sex, female, and/or in retaliation for the plaintiff’s complaints of discrimination,” the suit stated.
“Plaintiff believes, and therefore avers, that she was subjected to increased and unjustified scrutiny of her job performance to which other similarly-situated Caucasian individuals were not. Plaintiff believes, and therefore avers, that she was discriminated against by the defendant and not selected for the position of Caseworker Supervisor based on her race, African-American, her sex, female, and/or in retaliation for her complaint of discrimination. Plaintiff believes, and therefore avers, that the defendant’s conduct is part of a plan, pattern or practice of discrimination that may affect other similarly-situated individuals. On or about July 19, 2021, plaintiff was constructively discharged from her position as a result of the defendant’s ongoing conduct. As a direct and proximate result of the defendant’s actions, plaintiff has been adversely affected financially, professionally and emotionally.”
In a Dec. 12 partial motion to dismiss, the defendant argued that the plaintiff’s claims for disparate impact discrimination and sex discrimination were invalid.
“Plaintiff Walters provided no facts to suggest a Title VII disparate impact claim or a claim of sex discrimination following maternity leave at the EEOC level and has therefore failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to these claims. Plaintiff Walters alleges in her complaint that ‘defendant’s conduct is part of a plan, pattern or practice of discrimination that may affect other similarly situated individuals.’ To the extent that plaintiff is now trying to make out some sort of disparate impact claim, she has not preserved one at the EEOC level. When a plaintiff brings an employment discrimination claim under Title VII, [s]he must first exhaust his administrative remedies before filing a claim in District Court. A plaintiff must file a timely discrimination charge with the EEOC, and then must wait for the EEOC to complete its investigation and issue a right-to-sue letter before initiating an action with the Court,” the dismissal motion stated.
“Plaintiff Walters provided no facts to suggest a Title VII disparate impact claim at the EEOC level and has therefore failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to these claims. Plaintiff Walters’s EEOC charge only includes an allegations of discrimination directed at herself. Walters’s charge does not refer to any other similarly-situated female or African-American employees that may have also been subjected to discrimination or harmed by a facially-neutral policy. Rather, Walters’ charge solely encompasses the circumstances underlying her own alleged discrimination claims. Moreover, Walters’ EEOC charge does not state that her complaints constitute a ‘continuing action’ of ongoing discrimination. Plaintiff Walters states that defendant’s alleged discrimination ended on June 19, 2021 which is the same day Walters ended her employment with Allegheny County – even further illustrating that the charge is only about herself, not any other similarly situated employees.”
The motion continued that Walters’ EEOC charge does not allege facts to support a sex-based pregnancy discrimination claim following her return from maternity leave, as there are no facts in the charge relating to maternity leave or pregnancy.
“Plaintiff Walters only compares herself to similarly-situated Caucasian employees, not to similarly-situated male employees or those that did not take maternity leave. A fair reading of Walters’ EEOC charge illustrates that a pregnancy-based sex discrimination claim was not within the scope of the charge. Plaintiff Walters has not exhausted her administrative remedies with respect to pregnancy related sex discrimination claims and/or any claims of impact discrimination. Accordingly, they should be dismissed with prejudice,” the motion stated.
UPDATE
Counsel for Walters filed an opposition brief on Dec. 30, holding to her discrimination claims and maintaining that they were properly pled.
“Defendant’s arguments lack merit. Generally, the plaintiff has set forth a plausible claim for relief in her amended complaint that would allow this Honorable Court to draw the reasonable inference that plaintiff’s claim is viable, and that the defendant is liable for the violations alleged therein. Specifically, plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim was within the scope of her charge of discrimination and is therefore properly plead and included in her amended complaint. For the following reasons, plaintiff respectfully requests that this Honorable Court deny the defendant’s partial motion to dismiss plaintiff’s amended complaint in its entirety,” the brief stated, in part.
“[In her EEOC charge], plaintiff selected the ‘sex’ box on her charge of discrimination, in addition to the ‘race’ and “retaliation” boxes. (Plaintiff’s charge also included the following statement: ‘I believe that I was discriminated against because of my race, Black, sex, female, and retaliated against for complaining of unlawful employment practices in violation of Title VII of the Civil Right[s] Act of 1964, as amended, in that I was denied job status, my work was overly scrutinized, and I was denied a promotion.’) In light of these actions, plaintiff’s charge clearly alerted the EEOC of her intention to file sex-based claims and also should have informed the scope of the EEOC’s investigation. Thus, plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim was properly pled and included in her amended complaint. Accordingly, plaintiff respectfully requests that this Honorable Court deny defendant’s partial motion to dismiss Count II of plaintiff’s amended complaint.”
For counts of race discrimination, disparate impact discrimination, sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, plus violation of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, the plaintiff is seeking:
• That the Court enter a judgment declaring the defendant’s actions to be unlawful and violative of Title VII and the PHRA;
• That the Court award the plaintiff back pay damages and other benefits lost due to the defendant’s unlawful conduct plus interest from the date of discrimination;
• That the Court award the plaintiff compensatory and punitive damages as a result of the defendant’s actions being unlawful and violative of the PHRA;
• That the Court award the plaintiff pre-judgment and post-judgment interest from the date of the discrimination;
• That the Court award the plaintiff reasonable attorney’s fees and costs of this action; and
• That the Court grant the plaintiff such additional relief as may be just and proper.
The plaintiff is represented by Joel S. Sansone, Elizabeth Tuttle and Massimo A. Terzigni of the Law Offices of Joel Sansone, in Pittsburgh.
The defendant is represented by Frances M. Liebenguth of the Allegheny County Law Department, also in Pittsburgh.
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania case 2:22-cv-01051
From the Pennsylvania Record: Reach Courts Reporter Nicholas Malfitano at nick.malfitano@therecordinc.com