HARRISBURG – The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is set to decide whether a venerable tort law is applicable in the case of an at-will employee’s allegations that her supervisor at Drexel University acted against her out of personal bias and dislike.
“[Plaintiff Cara] Salsberg was hired by Drexel University as a tax accountant in the Office of Tax Compliance, where she worked under the supervision of [defendant Donna] Mann. During the course of her employment, Salsberg received mostly positive performance reviews from Mann. Salsberg’s performance reviews often indicated that she either met or exceeded expectations. As a result, Salsberg was promoted to tax compliance manager,” Superior Court of Pennsylvania Judge Jack Panella said.
“Shortly thereafter, the professional relationship between Salsberg and Mann began to deteriorate. The parties dispute the reasons for, and the circumstances of, this deterioration. Mann claims that Salsberg failed to perform like a salary-exempt manager, whereas Salsberg contends that Mann’s erratic workplace behavior was responsible for the breakdown in their professional relationship. In the end, Mann and Human Resources collectively decided that terminating Salsberg was the best course of action for the University. Mann and a representative from Human Resources summoned Salsberg to a meeting. At this meeting, Salsberg was notified of Drexel’s decision to terminate her employment because of deficient job performance.”
Subsequent to her termination, Salsberg filed suit against both Mann and Drexel University in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas in June 2017, alleging the following three claims:
• Mann had intentionally interfered with her contractual relations with Drexel;
• Drexel had breached an implied employment contract by firing her; and
• Both Drexel and Mann had intentionally inflicted emotional distress on her through this process.
In October 2018, Mann and Drexel University filed a motion for summary judgment seeking the dismissal of all counts. Three months later, in January 2019, the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Mann and Drexel University.
On appeal to the Superior Court, Salsberg contended that the trial court erred in granting judgment as a matter of law, on her claim for intentional interference with her at-will employment contract.
While Salsberg argued that an at-will employment relationship does not defeat a claim of intentional interference with that existing employment, Mann countered that Pennsylvania law does not recognize Salsberg’s claim for intentional interference with contractual relations.
According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 766, a party stating a cause of action for intentional interference with contractual relations must prove the following elements: (1) The existence of a contractual relationship between the complainant and a third party; (2) An intent on the part of the defendant to harm the plaintiff by interfering with that contractual relationship; (3) The absence of privilege or justification on the part of the defendant; and (4) The occasioning of actual damage as a result of defendant’s conduct.
The Superior Court issued its own opinion in the matter in September 2021, finding that the trial court committed no errors of law in its analysis and upheld its ruling. Panella authored the opinion on behalf of the Superior Court.
“Salsberg was an at-will employee in Drexel’s Office of Tax Compliance. Because an at-will employee may be discharged at any time, for any reason, or for no reason, Salsberg did not have any reasonable expectation of continued employment guaranteed by contract. However, the Supreme Court noted that there are exceptions to this general rule but in ‘only the most limited of circumstances, where discharges of at-will employees would threaten clear mandates of public policy.’ Clearly, the Supreme Court wishes to limit the impact of tort law on at-will employment,” Panella said.
“While Pennsylvania law provides a remedy for interference with expectations that are ‘something less than a contractual right,’ it does not provide a remedy where those expectations are a ‘mere hope.’ Therefore…we nevertheless conclude that Salsberg failed to state a cognizable claim for intentional interference with existing contractual relations. As a result, we…affirm the trial court’s order dismissing Salsberg’s complaint with prejudice.”
While Superior Court judges John T. Bender, Anne E. Lazarus, Carolyn H. Nichols, Mary P. Murray and Maria McLaughlin joined Panella’s majority opinion – fellow Superior Court Judge Victor P. Stabile filed a dissenting opinion, joined by colleagues Alice Beck Dubow and Megan McCarthy King.
As a result, Salsberg appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in late 2021.
On March 31, 2022, the state Supreme Court granted Salsberg’s petition for allowance of appeal, and is set to decide the following question: Whether Pennsylvania should apply the Restatement Second [of Torts] Section 766 to an intentional interference claim by an employee-at-will, against a supervisor who acted against that employee not as an agent on behalf of her employer, but ultra vires and pursuant to personal animus?
Arguments in the case are set to take place before the state’s high court on March 7.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania case 7 EAP 2022
Superior Court of Pennsylvania case 623 EDA 2019
Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas case 170603584
From the Pennsylvania Record: Reach Courts Reporter Nicholas Malfitano at nick.malfitano@therecordinc.com