WILLIAMSPORT – A federal judge has granted in part and denied in part a motion for summary judgment brought by the estate of a man who made violent threats against his wife’s nursing home, was involuntarily committed and had his weapons seized, prior to his death.
On Nov. 14, U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania Judge Matthew W. Brann handed down a split decision on the summary judgment motion filed by The Estate of Edward L. Himmelwright, against Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Benjamin J. Campana.
“Edward Himmelwright made a series of calls to the police threatening to commit a mass shooting at his wife’s nursing home. On June 29, 2019, he left a voicemail warning the State College Police that he intended to ‘open up’ with a gun at the nursing home. Himmelwright next threatened to go on a ‘rampage’ on July 9, 2019. Finally, he called back on July 10, 2019 to indicate that he planned to go to the nursing home with his gun and that he would shoot the police if they came to his house,” Brann said.
“Under Section 302 of the Mental Health Procedures Act (MHPA), an individual can be involuntarily committed for a maximum of 120 hours if it is determined that they are severely mentally disabled. On July 10, 2019, the Pennsylvania State Police obtained a Section 302 warrant to involuntarily commit Himmelwright. While serving this Section 302 warrant, Pennsylvania State Police officers observed firearms and ammunition in his home. After the warrant was upheld, Himmelwright was involuntarily committed on July 10, 2019. Based on these events, defendant then sought and received a search warrant for the guns on July 11, 2019. Campana seized the firearms that same day, but the search warrant provided the Pennsylvania State Police until 10 p.m. on July 12, 2019 to execute it.”
Campana filed a motion for summary judgment on Aug. 22 on two issues: 1) That exigent circumstances justified the July 11, 2019 search and seizure and 2) That sovereign immunity prevents the Estate from maintaining its trespass to chattels claim.
When conducting this analysis, Brann said that courts often consider the six Dorman factors:
• “The gravity of the crime that has been committed”;
• “A reasonable belief that the suspect is armed”;
• “A clear showing of probable cause based upon reasonably trustworthy information”;
• “A strong belief that the suspect is in the premises”;
• “A likelihood that the suspect will escape if not swiftly apprehended”; and
• “Peaceable entry, affording the suspect ‘an opportunity to surrender without a struggle and thus to avoid the invasion of privacy involved in entry into the home.”
“The first and third Dorman factors support Campana’s assertion that exigent circumstances existed. The gravity of threatening mass violence is rather severe and it heightens the urgency of the situation facing the Pennsylvania State Police. This urgency and Himmelwright’s ‘own, admitted words’ also support a finding of probable cause. Actually receiving the July 11 search warrant bolsters this conclusion. The second, fourth, fifth and sixth factors favor the plaintiff. According to the undisputed facts, Himmelwright was involuntarily committed when his firearms were seized. Defendant could not have reasonably believed that Himmelwright was armed on the premises, posed a risk of escape, or was likely to put up a struggle under these circumstances,” Brann said.
“This Dorman analysis provides mixed results. Himmelwright threatened to unleash mass violence and possessed the weapons to do so, but he was involuntarily committed when the search occurred. Further, the Pennsylvania State Police waited until July 11 to request a search warrant and were given until 10 p.m. on July 12 to execute it. These facts certainly raise doubts as to the urgency of the situation. For this reason, the Court will turn to other instances of warrantless searches and seizures for further guidance.”
Brann examined two opposing lines of reasoning that emerged when looking at warrantless searches and seizures under similar circumstances. Under the first series of cases, “securing the suspect terminated any exigency that may have existed”, whereas the second line of cases “suggests that exigent circumstances remain when there is the potential for an individual to harm themselves or others upon their release from custody.”
However, Brann also pointed out that despite authorizing involuntary commitments for individuals that pose a threat of harm to others, the state legislature specifically provided “a reasonable period of time, not to exceed 60 days” for these individuals to relinquish their firearms, under the MHPA.
According to Brann, “questions exist as to whether exigent circumstances authorized this search and seizure,” and thus he denied the summary judgment motion on that point.
On the subject of sovereign immunity, Brann found that it did bar the trespass to chattels claim, since Campana was acting within the scope of his employment.
“Based on the undisputed facts, Campana acted within the scope of his employment. Effectuating a search warrant is exactly the kind of conduct officers are ‘employed to perform.’ Campana also took the relevant actions in his capacity as a Pennsylvania State Police officer. Neither the complaint nor the facts suggest an alternative, improper motive to seize the firearms. The undisputed facts demonstrate that defendant acted in response to what he and the Pennsylvania State Police perceived as a security concern,” Brann stated.
“Even though there are now issues as to the validity of the warrant, that alone does not mean Campana acted outside the scope of his employment. ‘Under Pennsylvania law, even unauthorized acts may be within the scope of employment ‘if they are clearly incidental to the master’s business.’” Only a plausible ‘allegation that the defendant officer knowingly or purposefully’ acted without probable cause would shift this conduct to outside the scope of his employment. Here, the complaint only alleges that Campana entered Himmelwright’s ‘residence without good legal cause to do so.’ Nothing indicates that he purposefully or knowingly executed the warrant without probable cause. Consequently, defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because he acted within the scope of his employment, and sovereign immunity therefore bars this state law claim.”
The plaintiff is represented by Eric E. Winter of Cornerstone Law Office, in Blandon.
The defendant is represented by Jessica S. Davis of the Pennsylvania State Police, in Harrisburg.
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania case 4:21-cv-01731
From the Pennsylvania Record: Reach Courts Reporter Nicholas Malfitano at nick.malfitano@therecordinc.com