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Third Circuit will not reinstate suits over collection of post-employment union dues

PENNSYLVANIA RECORD

Saturday, December 21, 2024

Third Circuit will not reinstate suits over collection of post-employment union dues

Federal Court
Lfeliperestrepo

Restrepo | US Courts

PHILADELPHIA – The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently refused to reinstate a trio of federal court cases lodged against American Federation of State County and Municipal Employees and the Service Employees International Union local groups, over collection of dues from their members after their employment ended.

Third Circuit judges L. Felipe Restrepo, Theodore A. McKee and Marjorie O. Rendell ruled on Jan. 12 that litigation from plaintiffs Bradley Barlow, Frances Biddiscombe and a group of 14 others would not continue, upholding a prior ruling from the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.

Restrepo authored the Court’s ruling in this matter.

“Bradley Barlow and Frances Biddiscombe were members of Service Employees International Union (SEIU) Local 668, the bargaining unit representing employees of the Pennsylvania Department of Human Services (DHS). They each signed new union membership applications in June of 2018, voluntarily authorizing paycheck dues deductions. The authorizations were valid from year to year and irrevocable, regardless of membership status, unless the member provided written notice of revocation within a specified annual window of at least 10 days and not more than 30 days before the end of any yearly period. Barlow and Biddiscombe each submitted letters of resignation from SEIU Local 668 in July of 2020, after their annual revocation windows had passed. Pursuant to the authorizations, SEIU Local 668 continued to deduct membership dues until the annual revocation windows reopened in May and June of 2021,” Restrepo said.

“Miriam Fultz and 13 other members of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), Council 13, also signed union membership agreements in which they voluntarily authorized the deduction of membership dues from their paychecks. Those authorizations were irrevocable, regardless of union membership status, unless the member provided written notice of revocation during the 15 days before the annual anniversary date of the authorization. The 14 members each submitted letters of resignation from their union in 2020, either before or after their respective annual revocation windows were open. AFSCME, Council 13 notified each of them that, pursuant to their agreements, membership dues deductions would continue until a written request was resubmitted during the next annual revocation window several months to nearly a year later.”

Restrepo added that “despite having voluntarily joined their respective unions and authorizing ongoing dues deductions – regardless of membership status – in accordance with their membership agreements, none of the resigned union members were content to keep paying dues until their next annual revocation window period rolled around…so, they sued.”

“Invoking the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, appellants alleged deprivation of their First Amendment rights to be free from compelled speech in the form of union dues deductions. But Janus demarcated the constitutional rights of non-members employed in agency shop arrangements who never elected to join a union, not members who voluntarily join a union and later resign. Accordingly, the District Court properly dismissed appellants’ complaints [for failure to state claims upon which relief could be granted],” Restrepo said.

That decision led the plaintiffs to appeal to the Third Circuit, but Restrepo and his colleagues found that the cases were properly dismissed and the cases cited by the plaintiffs were not accurately comparable to the ones at issue.

“Janus says nothing regarding a consenting employee’s ability to contract to support a union for a time certain in exchange for the benefits of union membership. We reject the notion that appellants never consented to dues collection because their membership agreements did not constitute a valid waiver of their constitutional rights. Appellants implore us to follow the reasoning of constitutional waiver cases such as D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., Fuentes v. Shevin and their progeny. But these cases are inapposite and every court to weigh in on this argument has held that no such waiver is necessary because there is no constitutional right at issue here. We join our sister circuits in holding that the First Amendment does not extend a right which overrides appellants’ contractual obligations to pay dues until an agreed upon date, regardless of a subsequent choice to relinquish union membership,” Restrepo stated.

“Appellants argue that even if they must pay post-resignation dues, they are still entitled to procedures for notice and the ability to object to how those dues are spent by the unions, under Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson. Failure to provide such protections, they claim, is a violation of their due process rights. These claims fail on similar grounds as their First Amendment claims. Prior to Janus, when public-sector unions were still permitted to charge fees to union non-members under Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, the Supreme Court developed a system of procedures governing that collection. Before any fee deductions were made, unions were required to provide non-members with: (1) A detailed accounting of how their dues would be spent that distinguishes union expenses relating to collective bargaining (chargeable expenditures) and contract administration from political activity (non-chargeable expenditures); (2) An opportunity to object to this accounting before any dues are deducted from their paychecks; and (3) A procedure for review of the unions’ response to any objections by an impartial third-party decision-maker. Like Janus, Hudson was premised on a desire to avoid subjecting non-consenting individuals from subsidizing a political agenda with which they disagreed.”

Restrepo added that the appellants “argued, without reference to any authority, that once they resigned from their respective unions, they became nonmembers entitled to Hudson procedures.”

“Given that Janus was limited to the constitutional rights of non-consenting nonmembers, it is illogical that such rights would flow from Janus for those who consented to pay dues through a certain date (underscoring that reference to rights of ‘non-members’ in Janus should be understood as those previously subject to agency shop agreements, not formerly consenting members who have simply resigned from the union). We agree with the court below, that Hudson is inapplicable given appellants’ failure to allege any First Amendment violations,” Restrepo said.

“In opposition to appellees’ motion to dismiss, a subclass of Fultz appellants argued that their membership agreements were invalid for lack of consideration because they were already union members at the time of execution. Alternatively, they argued that the agreements lacked plain terms, or that the union materially breached by failing to perform. The District Court rejected the first two arguments because they were not raised in the pleadings but found that the third failed to state a claim because it was not plausible in light of the explicit member agreement language authorizing post-resignation dues deductions. We will affirm on the same basis, but we note that amendment would be futile. Appellants have not alleged that the terms of their original membership agreements entitled them to membership in perpetuity; such agreements are terminable at will. Membership is a state of being, the continuation of which would certainly provide adequate consideration supporting any new or additional terms. Further, any such state law claim would nevertheless lie outside the jurisdiction of the federal courts, as the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board has exclusive jurisdiction over matters stemming from allegations of unfair labor practices pursuant to PERA.”

For those reasons, the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s orders on all counts.

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit cases 21-3096, 21-3097 & 22-1108 

U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania cases 1:20-cv-02459, 4:20-cv-02462 & 1:20-cv-02107

From the Pennsylvania Record: Reach Courts Reporter Nicholas Malfitano at nick.malfitano@therecordinc.com

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