PITTSBURGH – West Homestead Borough, its police department and the department chief have countered claims from a pair of motorists who allegedly received serious and extensive injuries – when their vehicle collided with another car driven by a suspect being pursued by members of the West Homestead Police Department – by arguing that those same claims are not properly supported.
Lexis Windsheimer of McKees Rocks and Kayona Smart of Pittsburgh initially filed suit in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas on March 25 versus West Homestead Borough, West Homestead Police Department, its Chief of Police Charles Rozzo, plus John Does 1-2 and Roe Business Entities 1-2.
“On or about Nov. 16, 2022, a high-speed police chase ensued through the streets of McKeesport as McKeesport Police attempted to apprehend the driver of a 2017 silver Kia Forte, McKinnley Torrence. Torrence traversed through McKeesport into Duquesne at a high, dangerous, and egregious speed, endangering the lives of motorists and pedestrians, such that McKeesport police ended the pursuit. As Torrence continued to accelerate through Duquesne, Duquesne Police initiated a second high-speed chase, and like McKeesport Police, terminated the chase as the fleeing Kia approached egregiously dangerous speeds in the populated and bustling streets. Torrence proceeded at high speeds through West Homestead, when a West Homestead police officer (John Doe I) on-duty at the time, engaged Torrence in another high-speed pursuit,” the suit said.
“Doe I began the chase on Route 837, a major and busy thoroughfare which poured into the even more bustling, densely populated and pedestrian-filled streets of Pittsburgh's South Side. Doe I pursued Torrence at speeds in excess of 120 miles per hour spanning the entire length of Route 837 just before approaching the heavily trafficked corner of East Carson Street near the FBI building, at which point – even then – Doe I did not slow down or abandon the pursuit, forcing Torrence to increase speed through East Carson Street. As Torrence made his way at high speed into the curvy streets of the South Side with the Doe I relentlessly behind him, Torrence entered into oncoming traffic and struck plaintiffs’ vehicle head-on. The collision resulted in Torrence’s death, caused crumbling damage to both vehicles, and inflicted profound, life-altering injuries to plaintiffs and others. Doe I owed plaintiffs, users of the streets and thoroughfares upon which Doe I embarked on a high-speed pursuit, a duty of care to cease or abandon the high-speed chase when, as here, the circumstances thereof posed a grave, imminent, and unjustifiable risk of bodily harm to plaintiffs. Doe I pushed the limits at speeds in excess of 120 miles per hour in crowded neighborhoods, and thereby compelled the fleeing suspect to do the same.”
The suit added that “Doe I had actual knowledge, through police radio, that several police officers from various police departments outside of the West Homestead jurisdiction were chasing Torrence, but decided to terminate their pursuit as a result of numerous instances where Torrence nearly crashed into other vehicles or individuals and placed the general public at a grave and imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury.”
But, despite this knowledge, Doe I “engaged Torrence along the busiest streets of the city at astronomical speeds, exhibiting not merely negligent, but grossly negligent conduct and with reckless disregard for the life, bodily integrity and safety of others, including plaintiffs,” according to the suit.
“Defendants’ conduct, under color of state law, violated the constitutional rights of plaintiffs under the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and federal and state statutes, causing plaintiffs substantial harm. Defendants’ conduct, under color of state law, created a grave, unreasonable, capricious and unjustifiable risk of harm and substantial bodily injury to plaintiffs. Defendants were policymakers with respect to policing practices and thus any deliberate choice of action or conduct by defendants represents official policy of the state. At all times relevant, defendants knew that Torrence was being pursued for summary, misdemeanor or non-forcible felony offenses, and that as such, a high-speed chase would be prohibited under standard protocol, laws, rules, policies, and regulations. At all times relevant, defendants knew that if Torrence remained at large and was not pursued in a high-speed chase through populated streets, that Torrence would not pose any immediate or potential danger of death or serious bodily injury to others including plaintiffs,” the suit stated.
“At all times relevant, defendants knew that if Torrence was continuously pursued in a high- speed chase through populated streets, that Torrence would pose an immediate, unjustifiable danger of death or serious bodily injury to others including plaintiffs. As a direct and proximate result of the aforesaid defendants’ conduct as set forth herein, plaintiffs were injured and sustained severe bodily harm, and will continue to experience extreme conscious pain, suffering and loss of enjoyment of life. As a result of the alleged misconduct of these defendants, plaintiffs seek damages for the following injuries and damages: Fractures in the lower extremities and right foot, scarring and post-surgical complications, immobility to a clinically significant degree, generalized pain, tissue, muscle and skeletal injuries, fractured femur requiring surgery, facial lacerations and scarring, neck and lumbar injuries, abdominal injury, pain and suffering, past and future medical care expenses, loss of household services, loss of pleasures of life and hedonic damage, lost wages, loss of earning capacity, embarrassment, humiliation and mental anguish, punitive damages, attorneys’ fees and costs, any recoverable economic and noneconomic damages and any and all further legal or equitable relief the court deems appropriate.”
The defendants removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania on April 24, citing the federally-based claims at issue.
UPDATE
The defendants (minus the Roe Business Entities 1-2) motioned to dismiss the case on the ground of the complaint “contain[ing] numerous legal allegations that are not supported by the factual allegations necessary to uphold the legal remedies which they seek to assert against the defendants.”
“Count II of plaintiffs’ complaint is directed to all defendants and lays forth six allegations of negligence. Defendants West Homestead Borough and West Homestead Police Department are protected under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act. Charles Rozzo, in his official capacity as Police Chief, is protected under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act. A local agency is defined as ‘a government unit other than the Commonwealth’, a definition which includes the Borough. The Tort Claims Act imposes a shield of governmental immunity against any damages arising from an injury to any person or property caused by an act of a local agency or its employees or agents except within the limited avenues for recovery provided by the statute. Plaintiffs’ complaint, however, merely sets forth vague and unsubstantiated allegations of negligence directed to all parties, a pleading that is directly barred by the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act. Therefore, plaintiffs’ Count II should be dismissed as it does not plead a cause of action recognizable under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act,” according to the defense’s dismissal motion stated, in part.
“Section 1983 is the vehicle by which private citizens can seek redress for violations of federal constitutional rights committed by state officials. Municipalities, such as the Borough, are considered ‘persons’ under Section 1983 and may be held liable for injuries caused by violations of constitutional rights. They can only be held liable, however, ‘for their own illegal acts’. It is only when a municipality’s ‘execution of a policy or custom…inflicts the injury’ that the municipality ‘as an entity is responsible under Section 1983.’ Plaintiffs’ complaint contains conclusory allegations, as opposed to facts related to the existence of a specific governmental policy or how that policy caused plaintiffs’ injuries. For example, plaintiffs merely state ‘At all relevant times, defendants had a duty to take reasonable measures to guarantee plaintiffs’ bodily safety and to no create under color of state law a danger to same.’ This allegation does not identify a policy that eventually led to plaintiffs’ alleged injuries. To plead a Monell claim, a plaintiff ‘must identify a custom or policy, and specify what exactly that custom or policy was’. Plaintiffs’ complaint fails to allege any facts related to the existence of a municipal policy or custom or how the alleged policy or custom allowed the alleged constitutional violation to occur, or to identify a policymaker or decision maker responsible for a policy or custom.”
The motion added that vicarious liability due to the negligence of third parties could not be imposed upon municipal defendants, also per the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act – and that the claims as pled do not support a right to bodily integrity claim, since “the plaintiffs do not plead a search was conducted and the applicable law does not implicate a right of bodily integrity to high-speed pursuits where injury occurs.”
For counts of negligence, for violating bodily integrity under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, Monell liability and vicarious liability, the plaintiffs are seeking compensatory damages, punitive damages and any other damages not in excess of the compulsory arbitration amount, attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses of litigation and any further relief this Court deems just and appropriate.
The plaintiffs are represented by David M. Romanow and Ismail N. Yousef of Romanow Law Group, in Pittsburgh.
The defendant are represented by Mark R. Hamilton of Summers McDonnell Hudock Guthrie & Rauch, also in Pittsburgh.
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania case 2:24-cv-00620
Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas case GD-24-003476
From the Pennsylvania Record: Reach Courts Reporter Nicholas Malfitano at nick.malfitano@therecordinc.com