PITTSBURGH – A class action complaint that alleged U.S. Steel violated the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act (PMWA) by not paying employees for the time they spent showering and walking to their worksites, among other pre- and post-work activities, has been voluntarily dismissed.
Christopher Floyd first filed suit in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas on Jan. 16 versus United States Steel Corporation. Both parties are of Pittsburgh.
The complaint accused the corporation of failing to pay wages for time associated with various required work activities at the beginning and end of the workday within the premises of defendant’s Edgar Thomson Plant.
Those activities included walking to the locker room to change and shower and waiting for and donning personal protective equipment.
Counsel for U.S. Steel removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania on March 6.
“This action is being removed to this Court on the basis of preemption under 29 U.S.C. Section 185(a), as it involves a controversy requiring the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement governing the actions of the parties in interest. In particular, during his tenure with defendant USS, plaintiff was a member of the United Steel, Paper, and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union, a labor union with whom defendant USS has a CBA known as the ‘Basic Labor Agreement’, ‘BLA’ or ‘Agreement,” the removal notice stated.
“The BLA, among other things, addresses union members’ hours of work, work time, job duties, and rates of pay. Moreover, the BLA provides a pre-determined amount of compensation to certain employees for time spent performing preparatory or closing activities which occur outside of their scheduled shift or away from their worksite. At all times relevant to this action, plaintiff was employed at defendant USS’s Edgar Thomson Plant, which is specifically covered by the BLA. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that ‘as a matter of policy,’ defendant USS fails to compensate him and alleged class members for all time performing tasks prior to and after their scheduled shifts. The complaint also ‘challenges the legality under the PMWA of defendant’s company-wide timekeeping, compensation, and payroll practices.”
U.S. Steel’s added its “compensation ‘policy’ applicable to plaintiff and the class of employees he purports to represent is set by the BLA” and that “adjudication of his PMWA claim would necessitate interpretation and application of relevant provisions of the BLA governing plaintiff’s job duties and wages.”
“Under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), this Court has original jurisdiction over lawsuits concerning ‘violation[s] of contract between an employer and a labor organization.’ Additionally, ‘when resolution of a state-law claim is substantively dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between parties in a labor contract, that claim must be treated as an LMRA claim,” the removal notice added.
“Because the resolution of plaintiff’s PMWA claim would necessitate the analysis and interpretation of his job duties and wages as provided in the governing BLA, this Court has original jurisdiction over his claims pursuant to the LMRA’s complete preemption of such claims. Defendant USS files this notice without waiving any defenses to the claims asserted by plaintiff, without conceding that plaintiff has stated claims upon which relief can be granted, and without conceding that plaintiff is entitled to any damages against defendant in any amount. By filing this notice of removal, defendant does not make any admission of fact, law, or liability, including expressly without conceding that plaintiff is similarly situated to the alleged purported class. Defendant expressly reserves the right to raise any and all available procedural and substantive defenses.”
On March 22, the plaintiff motioned to remand the case to state court, arguing that the grounds for removing the matter to federal court were improper.
“On March 6, 2024, United States Steel Corporation removed this action from the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas to this Court. According to defendant, removal is proper because the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act claims of Christopher Floyd are pre-empted under Section 301 of the LMRA. Plaintiff submits that defendant cannot satisfy its heavy burden of proving that plaintiff’s PMWA claim is pre-empted. In this regard, the Court’s opinion in Beauregard v. Broadway Electric Service Corp. is instructive. As explained in Beauregard, a defendant seeking LMRA Section 301 pre-emption of a PMWA wage rights claim must demonstrate that that the PMWA claim is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the applicable collective bargaining agreement,” the remand motion stated, in part.
“This requires a showing that resolution of the PMWA claim turns on the actual interpretation of specific CBA previsions. The mere consultation of the CBA is not enough. Defendant’s remand papers fail to explain how plaintiff’s PMWA claim requires the interpretation of specific CBA provisions. As such, defendant’s sole basis for federal court jurisdiction – LMRA Section 301 pre-emption – is inapplicable, leaving the Court obliged to remand these related actions to the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas per 28 U.S.C. Section 1447(c).”
In an April 12 motion to dismiss the complaint, U.S. Steel argued, among other points, that the plaintiff’s case is predicated upon claims which are time-barred by a three-year statute of limitations.
“Although phrased as a complaint for unpaid wages under the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act, Mr. Floyd’s complaint is actually a claim for breach of a collective bargaining agreement which governs his employment, or alternatively, the resolution of his claim requires interpretation of various terms within that collective bargaining agreement governing the terms and conditions of his employment, as well as a provision explicitly covering the preliminary and post-liminary activities giving rise to his claim. Indeed, those terms are ‘inextricably linked’ to plaintiff’s claim. As such, even though brought under color of state law, plaintiff’s complaint is pre-empted by federal law, and specifically the Labor Management Relations Act. What’s more, under the LMRA, plaintiff is required to exhaust his administrative remedies through the union grievance procedures outlined in the collective bargaining agreement. Because he failed to do so, plaintiff’s claim must be dismissed with prejudice in its entirety,” the company’s dismissal motion stated.
“Moreover, plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to show that the preliminary and post-liminary activities underlying his claim were ‘hours worked’ under the PMWA. That is, he does not allege that defendant required him to perform these tasks at the workplace, or that he was considered ‘on duty’ when performing them. Therefore, he does not allege facts sufficient to show entitlement to the wages he claims, and for this reason as well, his claim must be dismissed. Finally, defendant’s records indicate that Mr. Floyd has not worked, or earned wages, at any defendant facility for over three years. However, the PMWA has a strict three-year statute of limitations. Because Mr. Floyd’s tenure falls outside this statute of limitations, his claim is time-barred. For this reason as well, his claim must be dismissed in its entirety.”
UPDATE
On April 22, the plaintiff and his counsel opted to voluntarily dismiss the case. The motion explained that the plaintiff had not listed the correct date his employment with U.S. Steel began, which did in fact time-bar his claims brought under the PMWA.
“Plaintiff Christopher Floyd voluntarily dismisses this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i). Defendant recently filed a motion to dismiss correctly asserting that plaintiff (who misremembered his dates of employment for defendant) is time-barred from pursuing his Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act claim. Had counsel for defendant simply called the undersigned to discuss this matter, the motion to dismiss could have been avoided,” according to the notice of dismissal.
The following day, April 23, U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania Judge William S. Stickman IV granted the dismissal and ordered the case closed.
The plaintiff was represented by Peter Winebrake and R. Andrew Santillo of Winebrake & Santillo, in Dresher.
The defendant was represented by Marla N. Presley and Laura C. Bunting of Jackson Lewis, also in Pittsburgh.
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania case 2:24-cv-00304
Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas case GD-24-000542
From the Pennsylvania Record: Reach Courts Reporter Nicholas Malfitano at nick.malfitano@therecordinc.com