PHILADELPHIA – A portion of claims has been dismissed from federal court litigation brought by a woman who said she was sexually assaulted by her Lyft driver in August 2021.
In a July 19 memorandum opinion, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania Judge Karen S. Marston ordered plaintiff Jane Doe A.F.’s claims for negligent supervision, negligent undertaking and punitive damages dismissed without prejudice and her negligent misrepresentation claim dismissed with prejudice, in her case against Lyft, Inc. and her assailant, Ntiamoah Brown.
“On Aug. 12, 2021, at 1:14 a.m., plaintiff and her friend ordered a ride through the Lyft application and were paired with defendant Brown. A few minutes later, at around 1:23 a.m., Brown dropped plaintiff’s friend off at her residence, leaving plaintiff alone in the backseat of the car. Brown continued towards plaintiff’s destination and began asking extremely inappropriate and harassing questions. Brown then pulled the car over without plaintiff’s consent, exited the driver’s seat, and entered the back of the car where plaintiff was seated. Brown removed plaintiff’s pants, forced her to perform oral sex on him and raped her repeatedly. Terrified and shocked, plaintiff rolled out of the vehicle and found her way home. Brown yelled that he would ‘see her tomorrow’ and laughed as she escaped the vehicle,” Marston said.
“Later that same morning, plaintiff reported the sexual assault to Lyft, initially exchanging messages with a member of the company’s safety team via the Lyft app and later speaking with a member of the company’s ‘escalation team’ over the phone. Lyft informed plaintiff that it would conduct an internal investigation into the incident. Plaintiff asserts that as a result of this assault, she has endured and will continue endure ‘pain and suffering, humiliation, embarrassment and mental anguish.”
After initially filing suit in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas in October 2023, Lyft soon removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, citing diversity of citizenship between the parties.
In her amended complaint, Doe asserted claims for negligence, gross negligence, vicarious liability and negligent performance of undertaking to render services against both defendants, negligent misrepresentation and negligent hiring, training, and supervision against Lyft, and assault and battery against Brown, in addition to punitive damages.
On Dec. 1, 2023, Lyft filed the instant motion to dismiss in which it argues that the amended complaint should be dismissed in its entirety and that plaintiff’s request for punitive damages should be stricken.
“On April 16, 2024, the Court heard oral argument on Lyft’s motion. At the outset of their argument, Lyft’s counsel informed the Court that they would be withdrawing their motion to dismiss as to Count I, the negligence and gross negligence claims. Plaintiff’s counsel then reciprocated and informed the Court that plaintiff would be withdrawing Count II, the vicarious liability claim. Plaintiff also informed the Court later in the argument that she would not be pursuing the negligent training or hiring portion of Count III and would instead be proceeding only on the negligent supervision portion of that claim,” Marston stated.
“And finally, plaintiff asked the Court to dismiss her negligent supervision claim and request for punitive damages without prejudice if the Court agreed with Lyft that plaintiff could not rely on four prior behavioral warnings against defendant Brown that plaintiff raised for the first time in her opposition to Lyft’s motion and did not include in her amended complaint. Thus, following oral argument, the only issues still before the Court are plaintiff’s claims for negligent performance of undertaking to render services, negligent misrepresentation, negligent supervision and punitive damages, with the viability of these latter two claims hinging on whether the Court will consider the prior behavioral warnings against Brown.”
Thus, the only claims remaining against Lyft were negligent supervision (part of Count III), negligent performance of undertaking to render services (Count IV) and negligent misrepresentation (Count VII), as well as the plaintiff’s request for punitive damages.
“Here, in arguing that Lyft knew or should have known that Brown had violent tendencies, plaintiff points to four prior complaints that passengers lodged against Brown. The problem for plaintiff, however, is that these facts do not appear in the amended complaint. Plaintiff cannot rely on facts that appear for the first time in her opposition to the motion to dismiss to state a claim,” Marston said.
“As plaintiff’s counsel conceded at argument, without the Court’s consideration of these prior behavioral reports, plaintiff’s claim for negligent supervision cannot survive. The amended complaint fails to allege past misconduct on the part of Brown and does not otherwise allege facts suggesting that Lyft knew or should have known that Brown had violent tendencies. The Court therefore grants Lyft’s motion as to the negligent supervision claim. However, because this claim suffers from under-inclusive pleading, the Court will dismiss without prejudice and permit plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint.”
Marston similarly dismissed the plaintiff’s negligent undertaking claim.
“Here, the Court finds that plaintiff’s negligent undertaking claim fails for two independent reasons. First, plaintiff has failed to allege that Lyft undertook to protect her from Brown. Plaintiff’s allegations on this front are threadbare and difficult to follow; however, plaintiff appears to claim that by providing transportation services to plaintiff, Lyft undertook a duty to protect her from her driver. But plaintiff fails to connect these dots and explain how Lyft, by providing transportation services, also assumed the duty to protect plaintiff from Brown,” Marston stated.
“Second, even assuming that Lyft undertook a duty to protect plaintiff, she has failed to state a claim for negligent undertaking because she asserts only that Lyft should have provided additional safety features on its platform, not that it implemented its existing security scheme negligently. In sum, plaintiff has failed to allege that Lyft undertook to protect her and has pled and argued this cause of action in a manner inconsistent with Pennsylvania’s admonishment that recipients of an undertaking cannot expect more than what is offered. The Court therefore dismisses plaintiff’s negligent undertaking claim. However, because these issues could be cured through more articulate pleading, the Court will dismiss this claim without prejudice and provide plaintiff leave to amend if she can state a claim for negligent undertaking.”
Finally, Marston dismissed the claims for negligent misrepresentation and punitive damages.
“Plaintiff has nevertheless failed to state a claim for negligent misrepresentation with respect to these statements because she has not alleged sufficient, non-conclusory facts demonstrating that they are false. As to Lyft’s claim that its protective safety features are always on, although plaintiff has alleged that Lyft could have and should have implemented additional safety measures she has not alleged that Lyft entirely lacks proactive safety measures or that the safety measures they do offer were inactive at the time of her assault. And as to Lyft’s statement that it offers ‘real help from real humans,’ plaintiff’s assertion that this statement is false is belied by her own allegations in the amended complaint in which she acknowledges that in the early hours of Aug. 12, 2021, she was connected with Lyft safety workers through a messaging feature on the Lyft application and spoke with members of the Lyft team on the phone about her assault. Since plaintiff has not pled facts suggesting that these statements are false, they cannot support a claim for negligent misrepresentation. Here, because, as plaintiff’s counsel suggested at oral argument, the ongoing discovery in this matter could prove that these statements are false, the Court will dismiss plaintiff’s claim as to these two statements without prejudice,” Marston said.
“Plaintiff conceded at oral argument that if the Court is unable to consider the four prior behavioral warnings against Brown, which are the primary basis for her punitive damages request, then her request for punitive damages should be dismissed without prejudice. The Court agrees. As previously discussed, the Court is unable to consider these past behavioral reports because they appeared for the first time in plaintiff’s opposition to Lyft’s motion to dismiss. And without any non-conclusory allegations that Lyft knew or should have known that Brown had violent or dangerous tendencies prior to assigning him to plaintiff’s ride, the Court fails to see a basis for plausibly finding that Lyft fostered any evil motive or demonstrated a reckless indifference to plaintiff’s rights. The Court therefore dismisses plaintiff’s request for punitive damages.”
Marston then granted Lyft’s motion to dismiss, striking the plaintiff’s claims for negligent supervision, negligent undertaking and negligent misrepresentation – while allowing the plaintiff to file a second amended complaint as to the claims dismissed without prejudice, consistent with the Court’s analysis.
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania case 2:24-cv-03990
From the Pennsylvania Record: Reach Courts Reporter Nicholas Malfitano at nick.malfitano@therecordinc.com