PITTSBURGH – A federal court in Pittsburgh has dismissed retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 but preserved a discrimination claim lodged under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, in litigation brought by a former Allegheny County Jail corrections officer who lost her job for refusing the COVID-19 vaccine.
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania Judge Robert J. Colville issued such a memorandum opinion on Aug. 5, in Tammy Laney’s litigation versus Allegheny County.
“Plaintiff, Tammy Laney, was employed by defendant as a correctional officer at the Allegheny County Jail from Nov. 2, 2015 to Dec. 2, 2021. Plaintiff is a ‘life-long devout member of the Christian faith,’ and submitted a religious exemption to defendant in response to the COVID-19 vaccine mandate. ‘In her exemption request, [plaintiff] informed defendant that she believes that her body is a holy temple of the Holy Spirit and that being vaccinated would entail going against her convictions and the commands of God.’ Additionally, plaintiff sent two emails to defendant ‘outlining why the vaccine violated her sincerely held religious beliefs.’ Plaintiff alleges that defendant ignored her emails and did not ‘engage in any meaningful interactive process with plaintiff to determine whether there existed any reasonable accommodations for her sincerely held religious beliefs.’ Plaintiff further alleges that defendant’s sole reason for denying her religious exemption was that ‘it would create an undue hardship on Allegheny County,” Colville said.
“Additionally, plaintiff alleges that defendant originally provided her with reasonable accommodations including ‘personal protection equipment, testing, social distancing and/or sanitizing’ throughout the pandemic. Then, on Dec. 1, 2021, plaintiff alleges that the accommodations became an undue hardship when the vaccine mandate was put into place by defendant. On Dec. 1, 2021, following the institution of the vaccine mandate, plaintiff was terminated ‘solely due to her unvaccinated status’ and despite her offer to continue to use the above listed accommodations. Based on these allegations, plaintiff brings claims for discrimination, retaliation, and wrongful discharge pursuant to Title VII at Count I and religious discrimination and retaliation pursuant to the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act at Count II. She alleges that she has satisfied all of her administrative prerequisites to file suit because she filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and cross-filed it with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission. Plaintiff alleges the EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue on Oct. 18, 2022, and she filed her complaint within 90 days of the receipt of that notice.”
On Nov. 30, 2023, the defendant filed its motion to dismiss, along with its brief in support. On Jan. 12, 2024, the plaintiff filed a brief in opposition, along with an affidavit in opposition. On Jan. 19, 2024, the defendant filed a motion to strike plaintiff’s affidavit. Then, on Jan. 29, 2024, the plaintiff filed a supplemental brief in opposition.
Colville began his analysis by deciding to grant the defense motion to strike the affidavit.
“Plaintiff filed an affidavit in opposition to defendant’s motion to dismiss. As argued by defendant, the Court cannot consider this affidavit at the motion to dismiss stage. The affidavit was offered only to clarify or correct allegations in the fourth amended complaint, and, therefore, it is not a document that is indisputably authentic or otherwise integral to or explicitly relied upon by the complaint. Accordingly, the Court cannot consider the affidavit in resolving defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion. For the reasons stated above, the Court will grant defendant’s motion to strike and will not consider plaintiff’s affidavit when deciding the motion to dismiss,” Colville stated.
Colville next turned to the motion to dismiss both of the plaintiff’s counts, beginning with the retaliation count under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
“Defendant argues that plaintiff ‘provided no facts to suggest a Title VII retaliation claim at the administrative level and has therefore failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to her Title VII retaliation claim.’ Defendant further argues that plaintiff’s charge only indicates that she was discriminated against on the basis of religion. Plaintiff does not object to withdrawing her claim for retaliation based on defendant’s arguments. The Court agrees with both parties that plaintiff has failed to adequately exhaust her administrative remedies as to her Title VII retaliation claim,” Colville said.
“Because plaintiff has consented to withdrawing her Title VII retaliation claim, defendant’s motion to dismiss Count I, as to the retaliation claim only, is granted, with prejudice. Because plaintiff is withdrawing her Title VII retaliation claim, the Court will not address the remainder of defendant’s arguments that plaintiff failed to state a claim as to her Title VII retaliation claim.”
As to the discrimination claim brought under the PHRA, Colville ordered that one would remain in the case and denied the dismissal motion on that point alone.
“Here, defendant argues that plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to Count II because plaintiff did not file her EEOC Charge with the PHRC. In support of this argument, defendant states that plaintiff’s EEOC Charge does not contain a PHRC docket number and plaintiff did not allege that she filed her EEOC charge with the PHRC or receive a right to sue letter from the PHRC. Instead, defendant argues that the ‘only possible assertion that this matter was filed with the PHRC is found in the form language of the Charge which states, ‘I understand this charge will be filed with both the EEOC and the State or local Agency, if any.’ Defendant argues this is not enough for the Court to find that she exhausted her administrative remedies. Plaintiff disagrees and argues that because her EEOC Charge states that she wishes the Charge be filed with both the EEOC and the State or local Agency, the Court can find that she has exhausted her administrative remedies,” Colville stated.
“Plaintiff’s EEOC charge states that she would like her Charge to be filed with both the EEOC and any State or local Agency. Additionally, at the top of the Charge, plaintiff typed in ‘Pennsylvania Human Relation Commission’ in the State or local Agency box. This is enough for the Court to find, at this stage, that plaintiff sufficiently requested that her Charge be filed with the PHRC. Additionally, plaintiff attached a letter from the PHRC in her supplemental brief. Unlike plaintiff’s affidavit, discussed above, this document is indisputably authentic and integral to the complaint. Therefore, the Court may rely on it when deciding the motion to dismiss. This letter, dated Jan. 24, 2024, informs plaintiff that her case in the PHRC has been closed because she filed a civil action in state or federal court. It also provides a case number for both her PHRC claim and EEOC claim. Based on the above, the Court finds that there are questions of fact as to whether plaintiff exhausted her administrative remedies with the PHRC. Therefore, the Court will deny defendant’s motion to dismiss Count II.”
Thus, Colville granted the defendant’s motion with prejudice, as to plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim at Count I, denied the defendant’s motion as to Count II and granted the defendant’s motion to strike.
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania case 2:23-cv-00056
From the Pennsylvania Record: Reach Courts Reporter Nicholas Malfitano at nick.malfitano@therecordinc.com