PHILADELPHIA – A federal judge has partially granted a dismissal motion from the City of Philadelphia and retained claims of due process violations, conspiracy and Monell violations, in a civil rights suit brought by a man once convicted of murder, but whose conviction was overturned three years ago.
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania Judge Juan R. Sanchez handed down such a ruling on Aug. 13, in Samuel Carson’s lawsuit versus the City, the Philadelphia Police Department, former Philadelphia District Attorney Lynne Abraham, former Assistant District Attorneys David Desiderio and Charles A. Grant, and a group of Philadelphia Police Department homicide detectives and Officer Glenn Keenan.
“On Nov. 22, 1993, William Lloyd was shot to death on the 2100 block of Clymer Street in Philadelphia. Philadelphia Police Department Homicide Detectives Mangoni, Collins and Reinhold and Police Officer Glenn Keenan all participated in the murder investigation. Plaintiff Samuel Carson was arrested, charged, and tried for Lloyd’s murder. At trial, the Commonwealth’s case primarily depended on four witnesses: Edgar Clark, Ramon Burton, Monique Wylie and Ruth Beverly. The complaint provides no detail regarding Clark’s testimony, but alleges it was obtained through ‘coercion and falsification.’ As to Burton, the complaint alleges he was a known drug dealer and undocumented immigrant with an outstanding arrest warrant, which ‘was used to compel favorable trial testimony.’ The third witness, Wylie, had a criminal record, was on probation at the time of the shooting, and was awaiting sentencing on a probation violation. Assistant District Attorney David Desiderio met with Wylie before trial and offered her a reduced sentence, if she testified that Carson had solicited her to assist in a robbery. Wylie refused, but at trial ADA Desiderio introduced testimony by Officer Keenan stating Wylie ‘made…inculpatory statements [implicating Carson in a robbery attempt] on a prior occasion.’ Wylie subsequently swore in an affidavit she had not witnessed Lloyd’s murder, but ‘was pressured directly by ADA Desiderio to testify that she had done so.’ The fourth witness, Beverly, had a chronic drug addiction and was the only alleged eyewitness to Lloyd’s murder,” Sanchez said.
“On July 14, 1995, Carson was convicted of first-degree murder, and on July 18, 1995, he was sentenced to death. He spent 16 years on death row before a state court commuted his sentence to life in prison. Carson continued to pursue relief through collateral attack, and in 2019, the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office (the “DA” or “DA’s Office”) provided him with the prosecution and homicide detective files. These files contained three previously undisclosed witness statements. The first statement was from eyewitness Ronald Waters, which was taken by Detective Mangoni. Waters’ statement contradicted Burton’s trial testimony. The second statement was provided by Charlene Matthews, who was interviewed by Detective Collins. Matthews was Burton’s common-law wife, and her statement also contradicted his trial testimony. The third statement, by Gwendolyn Schilling, was taken by Detective Reinhold and contradicted some of the evidence ADA Desiderio introduced at trial. ‘Although the Philadelphia DAs [sic] Office possessed the statements,’ all three were ‘excluded from the discovery letter sent by ADA [Charles] Grant to the Carson trial counsel.”
Carson alleged that at the time of his investigation and trial for Lloyd’s murder, the City of Philadelphia and its Police Department “maintained a pattern and practice of misconduct in homicide investigations, including fabrication of evidence, unlawful interrogation of witnesses, and failure to conduct proper investigations.”
In support, he points to numerous cases from the late 1980s and early 1990s in which police misconduct occurred in criminal investigations, and further alleged the Philadelphia Police Department and the DA’s Office both maintained a pattern and practice of coercing inculpatory statements from witnesses, and that the Police Department failed to adequately supervise and discipline police misconduct.
On July 12, 2021, after Carson had spent 27 and a half years in prison, his conviction was vacated on collateral review. Carson pled guilty to third-degree murder in exchange for a sentence of 14 to 28 years of incarceration, instead of waiting for a new trial. He was thereafter released immediately on time served.
On July 12, 2023, Carson filed this action, the City defendants motioned to dismiss the case on Sept. 19, 2023, and Carson filed a response in opposition on Oct. 10, 2023.
“The City defendants move to dismiss all claims against them, arguing (1) this suit is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, (2) the complaint does not allege Detectives Mangoni, Collins and Reinhold violated Carson’s constitutional rights, (3) they have qualified immunity with respect to the failure to intervene claim because it is not a clearly established right in the context of trials, and (4) the complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to state claims for civil rights conspiracy, supervisory liability and municipal liability,” Sanchez stated.
“Carson withdraws the failure to intervene claim, but otherwise opposes the motion. The Court will first address the argument raised by the City defendants under Heck v. Humphrey, and then the argument that Detectives Mangoni, Collins and Reinhold did not violate Carson’s constitutional rights. Finally, the Court will address each remaining claim for civil rights conspiracy, failure to intervene, supervisory liability and municipal liability in turn.”
Sanchez explained that the due process violation would stay in the case.
“Carson’s Fourteenth Amendment claims for fabrication and withholding of evidence are premised on Officer Keenan’s false testimony at trial, the DA’s failure to share three witness statements with Carson’s trial counsel, and ADA Desiderio’s attempt to pressure Wylie into giving false testimony. These claims undoubtedly implicate Carson’s trial and first conviction, which was overturned on collateral review. But the Court concludes the claims do not implicate the validity of Carson’s second conviction for two reasons. First, Carson pled guilty to third-degree murder with knowledge of the full body of evidence resulting from Lloyd’s murder investigation, including the previously undisclosed witness statements,” Sanchez said.
“Second, Carson’s ultimate guilt or innocence has no bearing on the due process violations alleged. Carson could be guilty of Lloyd’s murder, but he would still have claims for fabrication of evidence and Brady violations in the first prosecution. Therefore, the Court concludes Heck does not bar these claims as asserted in Count I of the complaint. Further, to the extent Carson’s claims for civil rights conspiracy, supervisory liability and municipal liability (Counts II, V, VI and VII) are premised on the alleged fabrication of evidence and Brady violations during his first prosecution, these claims do not implicate his 2021 guilty plea. As such, Heck does not bar those claims.”
However, Sanchez did dismiss the malicious prosecution claim with prejudice.
“Count III, a malicious prosecution claim against the individual defendants, is the last claim to consider vis-à-vis the Heck bar. To state a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must plead: (1) The defendant[s] initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) The criminal proceeding ended in [his] favor; (3) The defendant[s] initiated the proceeding without probable cause; (4) The defendant[s] acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) They suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding,” Sanchez said.
“Because Carson pled guilty to third-degree murder, this claim fails at the second step: the criminal proceedings related to Lloyd’s murder did not end in Carson’s favor. For the same reason, this claim is also barred by Heck because success would necessarily call Carson’s 2021 plea into doubt. The City defendants’ motion to dismiss will be granted as to Count III’s claim for malicious prosecution. And because amendment would be futile, Count III will be dismissed with prejudice.”
Sanchez also dismissed all claims against Detectives Mangoni, Collins and Reinhold – since “these allegations do not state any claim for constitutional violations by the Detective defendants, as there are no specific allegations of misconduct in their investigatory work, and the three Brady statements were omitted from discovery by the DA’s Office, not by the Detectives.”
Sanchez opted to retain the claim for civil conspiracy, but dismiss the claim for supervisory liability.
“Having addressed the City defendants’ arguments which pertain to multiple claims, the Court will now consider their claim-specific arguments, beginning with Count II, civil rights conspiracy. To state a claim for civil rights conspiracy pursuant to Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) Two or more persons conspire to deprive any person of [constitutional rights]; (2) One or more of the conspirators performs…any overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (3) That overt act injures the plaintiff in his person or property or deprives the plaintiff of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States,’ with the added gloss under Section 1983 that the conspirators act ‘under the color of state law.’ The first element requires that the conspirators ‘reached an understanding’ to deprive [the plaintiff] of his constitutional rights,’ the City defendants argue the complaint does not allege facts indicating they reached an agreement or understanding. Because Detectives Mangoni, Collins and Reinhold will be dismissed, the only City defendant left in this claim is Officer Keenan. The complaint alleges he falsely testified at the request of ADA Desiderio. This allegation implies the requisite ‘understanding’ to fabricate evidence in violation of Carson’s Fourteenth Amendment rights. The motion to dismiss this claim will thus be denied as to Officer Keenan,” Sanchez stated.
“Carson’s failure to train claim fails with respect to the DA’s Office because he has not pled that ‘the situation involves a difficult choice or a history of employees mishandling.’ The pertinent section of the complaint alleges the DA’s Office routinely violated Brady. But it fails to outline a need for training due to a ‘difficult choice,’ or to cite specific cases or examples which would show the necessary history of ‘mishandling.’ As to the Police Department, the Court has already concluded the complaint fails to allege any constitutional violations by Detectives Mangoni, Collins and Reinhold. With respect to Officer Keenan’s false testimony, the failure to train claim runs into a different problem. Although the complaint details police misconduct in other homicide investigations from the 1980s and 1990s, these allegations pertain to coercion of witnesses. False testimony and investigatory misconduct are different violations, and Carson has not pled any facts which show the Police Department (or the DA’s Office) routinely failed to train its employees to refrain from perjury. Therefore, the City defendants’ motion to dismiss will be granted as to Carson’s claim for supervisory liability (failure to train).”
Sanchez also retained the claims for Monell liability.
“Carson has pled the following misconduct: coercion of a false statement from Wylie by ADA Desiderio, false testimony by Officer Keenan and withholding three Brady statements by the DA. Carson has also pled the DA’s Office, together with the Police Department, had a policy or custom of coercing false statements, the DA’s Office had a policy or custom of suppressing Brady material and the City of Philadelphia failed to adequately discipline police officers for misconduct,” Sanchez said.
“He has not, however, pled the Police Department had a policy or custom of testifying falsely in court. As such, the motion to dismiss will be denied insofar as Carson seeks to bring a municipal liability claim premised on fabrication of evidence, Brady violations and failure to discipline. To the extent Carson seeks to bring a municipal liability claim based on any other theory, the Court agrees with the City – the pleadings do not clearly establish the theory of liability or the causal link between the misconduct in this case and a municipal policy or custom.”
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania case 2:23-cv-02661
From the Pennsylvania Record: Reach Courts Reporter Nicholas Malfitano at nick.malfitano@therecordinc.com