PHILADELPHIA – A lawsuit brought by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission against the Defender Association of Philadelphia will continue toward trial, after a federal judge denied the latter’s motion for summary judgment.
The EEOC of Washington, D.C. first filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on April 26, 2019 versus the Defender Association of Philadelphia.
“The Defender Association provides legal defense for indigent juveniles and adult criminal defendants. In September 2007, charging party M.P. began working as a full-time staff attorney for the Defender Association. M.P. was promoted multiple times over the years. In July 2012, the Defender Association promoted M.P. to Assistant Supervisor of the Juvenile Special Cases section where her role involved defending juveniles charged with sex-based crimes. A year later, in July 2013, the Defender Association promoted M.P. to Supervisor of Juvenile Special Cases Section. In June of 2014, M.P. was assigned as a Sexually Violent Predator Specialist. In April 10, 2017, M.P. applied for and was again assigned to the position of Supervisor of the Juvenile Special Cases Section,” U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania Judge Cynthia M. Rufe said.
“On July 26, 2017, M.P. began therapy sessions with Laurie Patterson, a licensed clinical social worker. Two days later, the Defender Association approved M.P.’s medical leave of absence under the Family and Medical Leave Act. Patterson diagnosed M.P. with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Major Depressive Disorder on Aug. 1, 2017. The Defender Association’s employees are entitled to receive short-term disability benefits. Defendant’s short-term disability insurance policy provides for a maximum of 11 weeks of coverage, after which the employee either may return to work or apply for long-term disability. M.P. was approved for short term disability benefits in the summer of 2017.”
In October of 2017, Patterson prepared an Intake, Record Summary and Assessment for M.P., which recommended she work in a different unit upon her return to work in January 2018.
“In November 2017, Patterson provided the October 2017 Medical Memorandum to Lincoln Financial, defendant’s short-term and long-term disability insurance provider, and Lincoln approved M.P. for long-term disability benefits. Internal records from Lincoln indicated that M.P. had a potential return to work date of Jan. 18, 2018, but that Lincoln should check in with M.P. in November regarding the ‘progress or improvement on returning back to work.’ Lincoln records also indicated that the vocational rehabilitation provider terminated its services with M.P. ‘as claimant was non responsive to [voicemails] for [return to work] intervention,” Rufe stated.
“Sherri Darden, the Defender Association’s Human Resources Manager, was notified in November that M.P. had been approved for long-term disability benefits. On Nov. 17, 2017, at Darden’s request, M.P. provided Darden with Patterson’s October 2017 Medical Memorandum. After receiving this letter, Darden discussed next steps with HR Director Mark Sappir. On Dec. 14, 2017, Darden sent M.P. a letter stating that she was being terminated effective Dec. 15, 2017. M.P. remained on long-term disability benefits until the fall of 2018.”
The Defender Association produced the five-page expert report of Irene Mendelson, a vocational counselor, and seeks to offer her expert testimony at trial. Although the Defender Association originally stated that this report would opine on whether M.P. could perform the essential functions of her job, the report instead discusses the reasonableness of defendant’s decision to terminate M.P. M.P.’s mitigation efforts after her termination.
The EEOC moves to exclude the report and expert testimony of Mendelson, because her report and opinion (1) will not help the trier of fact understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue; (2) are not based on sufficient facts or data; and (3) are not reliable.
Rufe ultimately opted to exclude the report, for lack of clarifying information related to the methodology which Mendelson used to arrive at her conclusions.
“Mendelson does not explain what methodology she employed in reaching her conclusions. Since Mendelson relies on largely irrelevant facts, does not state a methodology, and reaches a conclusion that would be unhelpful to a jury, her opinion on the reasonableness of the Defender Association’s termination decision will be excluded,” Rufe said.
For similar reasons, Rufe also ruled to exclude the termination opinion within Mendelson’s report.
As to the parties’ respective motions for summary judgment, Rufe found that disputes of material fact in the case would need to be resolved at trial.
“Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to EEOC, a reasonable jury could conclude based on the October 2017 Memorandum that M.P. could return in January 2018 with accommodation. EEOC’s argument is bolstered by the fact that Patterson testified in her deposition that the ‘feasibility’ language in the letter was about M.P. returning to her previous role involving sex crimes (not about her start date in January 2018) and that, if defendant had contacted her, Patterson would have clarified that M.P. could return to work in January 2018 if she were placed in a non-sex crimes unit,” Rufe said.
“However, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Defender Association, a reasonable jury could conclude that it was unlikely that M.P. could return to work in January 2018 and that she would require disability leave for an undefined period. The Defender Association’s interpretation of the letter is supported by M.P.’s verification on her long-term disability form that she was ‘totally disabled’ and the fact that – as written in the October 2017 Medical Memorandum – she had a panic attack the one time she had attempted to enter the office building that fall. These are questions that must be resolved at trial.”
For a count of disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, the plaintiff is seeking an injunction preventing further violations of that law, back pay with pre-judgment interest, reinstatement or front pay, compensation for past and future pecuniary losses, punitive damages, costs and such further relief as the Court deems necessary and proper in the public interest.
The plaintiff is represented by Joshua Zugerman, Rebecca Sam Wallace and Maria Luisa Morocco of the EEOC, in Philadelphia and Washington, D.C.
The defendant is represented by Richard R. Harris, Madeline Fenton and Tara Param of Holland & Knight, in Philadelphia.
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania case 2:19-cv-01803
From the Pennsylvania Record: Reach Courts Reporter Nicholas Malfitano at nick.malfitano@therecordinc.com