PHILADELPHIA – A federal appeals court has upheld the reduction of a $500,000 punitive damages award to $30,000, in the case of a woman who suffered damage to her repossessed vehicle and alleged wrongful arrest by the Pennsylvania State Police.
On Oct. 1, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit judges Michael A. Chagares, Thomas M. Hardiman and Paul B. Matey affirmed such a reduction in the case brought by plaintiff Angela Hyman.
Hyman defaulted on her car loan from Capital One Auto Finance, leading Capital One to hired Jeff Brunner of Commonwealth Recovery Group to repossess the car.
On Oct. 5, 2016, Brunner arrived – without a court order – at Hyman’s residence. Hyman’s wife, Shyree Johnson, ran outside and asked to remove their belongings from the car, and Brunner agreed.
But then Johnson locked herself in the vehicle, preventing the repossession. Hyman called her daughter, a law student, for advice, and both parties called the Pennsylvania State Police. Several officers, including Corporal Bryan Devlin, responded.
A standoff happened next, until Devlin told Johnson that Brunner needed to repossess the car that night and directed her to exit the vehicle. Devlin warned that if she did not, he would break the window, remove her, and arrest her for disorderly conduct.
Subsequently, Hyman’s daughter told Devlin that he could not intervene in a civil matter and was breaking the law. Devlin calmly responded, ‘OK, you can file a complaint on me later.’ Johnson eventually complied with Devlin’s command and Brunner towed the car.
“As a result of the encounter, Hyman filed a complaint against Devlin under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging that, by aiding in a private repossession, he violated her constitutional rights. Following trial, a jury returned a verdict in Hyman’s favor, awarding her $5,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive damages,” Matey said.
“Devlin then moved for judgment as a matter of law, claiming he was entitled to qualified immunity, and sought constitutionally required reduction of the punitive damages award. The District Court denied his qualified immunity defense but reduced punitive damages to $30,000. These timely appeals followed.”
Initially, the Third Circuit ruled that Devlin was not entitled to qualified immunity, since he violated established law in affirmatively aiding the repossession, when he forced Johnson out of the car.
“When he arrived Brunner ‘couldn’t do anything.’ Then, Devlin threatened to break the window, pull Johnson out, and place her under arrest. Only then was Brunner able to tow the car,” Matey said.
The Third Circuit further said its analysis showed the District Court did not err in finding the award of $500,000 was “unconstitutionally excessive.”
“Hyman’s harm was mainly economic, with some physical repercussions. On the other hand, Devlin’s conduct evinced some indifference to or a reckless disregard of the safety of others when he threatened to shatter a glass car window and pull Johnson out. And while the record does not show a pattern of repeated conduct, Devlin testified he would “absolutely not” behave differently in the future,” Matey stated.
Finally, Devlin’s admission that he knew his actions were illegal could constitute intentional malice, as we have held ‘malice’ and ‘reckless indifference,’ in [the federal civil rights action] context…refer…to the [defendant’s] knowledge that [he] may be acting in violation of federal law.’ On balance, Devlin’s conduct displayed some reprehensibility, but it was not “sufficiently egregious” to support the jury’s punitive damages award
Matey added while Hyman’s actual harm flowed from the seizure of her car and the resulting hardship and distress (for which she was compensated $5,000), Johnson suffered all the threatened potential harm that Hyman argued should raise the denominator, including the unnecessary force and false arrest.
“Finally, neither party points to any factually similar cases. Taken together, the District Court did not err in finding Devlin’s behavior was not reprehensible enough to sustain a 100:1 ratio of punitive damages to actual and potential harm to the plaintiff,” Matey said.
“And while review of a punitive damages award requires ‘a measure of deference’ to the jury’s determination, the District Court was required to ‘decrease the award to an amount the evidence will bear, which amount must necessarily be as high – and may well be higher – than the level the court would have deemed appropriate if working on a clean slate.’ We will affirm the District Court’s order reducing the punitive damages.”
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit cases 19-2495 & 19-2496
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania case 3:17-cv-00089
From the Pennsylvania Record: Reach Courts Reporter Nicholas Malfitano at nick.malfitano@therecordinc.com