PHILADELPHIA – A federal judge ruled that a man arrested during a narcotics investigation and whose charges were later dismissed, cannot file a third amended complaint in his lawsuit for wrongful arrest and imprisonment against members of the Philadelphia Police Department.
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania Gerald J. Pappert ruled July 1 to deny plaintiff Eric Farrow’s motion to file a third amended complaint against six Philadelphia police officers: Erik Pross, Robert Killman, Michael Boyes, Steven Hunter, John Seigafuse and Thomas Schaffling.
“Defendants arrested Farrow on Nov. 19, 2018, during a narcotics investigation. Farrow was detained from Nov. 19 until Feb. 11, 2019, when all charges against him were dismissed in Philadelphia Municipal Court. He now sues each defendant for false arrest, false imprisonment, failure to intervene and malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. Sections 1983, 1985 and 1988,” Pappert said.
“Farrow filed his initial complaint on Nov. 18, 2020, against the City of Philadelphia and John/Jane Doe police officers. On Jan. 7, 2021, Farrow filed an amended complaint against only the John/Jane Does. After the Court ordered Farrow to show that he had properly served the unidentified officers, Farrow sought leave to file a second amended complaint naming them. Farrow filed his second amended Complaint on April 27, 2021.”
On May 14, the defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), on two grounds for failure to state a claim. First, they argued the applicable statute of limitations barred each claim in Farrow’s second amended complaint. Second, they contended that even if the claims were timely, Farrow did not allege specific facts linking each defendant to his claims. Instead of responding to this motion, Farrow sought leave to file a third amended complaint.
“Farrow’s claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. The false arrest, false imprisonment and failure to intervene claims accrued when Farrow was arrested on Nov. 19, 2018. So Farrow had to file suit on those claims by Nov. 19, 2020. Farrow’s malicious prosecution claim accrued on Feb. 11, 2019, the day the charges against him were dismissed. He thus had to sue on that claim no later than Feb. 11, 2021,” Pappert said.
“Here, Farrow named the John Doe defendants for the first time in the second amended complaint on April 27, 2021. That filing well exceeds the two-year limitation on each claim. Farrow’s second amended complaint can survive dismissal only if it relates back to the original complaint.”
However, Pappert found that the complaint was not properly related back to its original iteration.
“Farrow does not show that any of the named defendants had actual notice of the suit within the 90-day period after he filed the original complaint. In the absence of actual notice, Farrow must show that defendants had constructive notice. The Third Circuit recognizes two methods by which district courts can impute notice under Rule 15(c): The ‘shared attorney’ method and the ‘identity of interest’ method,” Pappert said.
“Here, the City Solicitor’s office defended the City against Farrow’s original complaint and now represents the individual defendants. But Farrow has not shown that the City’s attorney ‘had any communication or relationship whatsoever’ with the individual defendants within the 90-day period after he filed the original complaint. Therefore, the Court cannot impute notice under the shared attorney method.”
But the Court cannot show notice via the identity of interest method, either, as both the District Court and the Third Circuit, “have found that police officers are non-management employees who cannot be said to have imputed knowledge of a suit that was served only on the City of Philadelphia.”
“Farrow has provided no evidence that would lead to a contrary finding here. Accordingly, the Court cannot impute notice under the identity of interest method. Because Farrow cannot show actual or constructive notice to the individual defendants, the Court need not address the third relation back requirement or defendants’ alternative arguments for dismissal,” Pappert said.
“Farrow’s second amended complaint, filed well after the statute of limitations expired on each claim, does not relate back to the filing of the original complaint. Because further amendment would be futile, the Court dismisses the second amended complaint with prejudice and denies Farrow’s third motion for leave to file an amended complaint.”
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania case 2:20-cv-05792
From the Pennsylvania Record: Reach Courts Reporter Nicholas Malfitano at nick.malfitano@therecordinc.com