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Third Circuit: Tunkhannock School District authorities acted properly, when firing principal for DUI's

PENNSYLVANIA RECORD

Friday, November 22, 2024

Third Circuit: Tunkhannock School District authorities acted properly, when firing principal for DUI's

Schools
Thomaslambro

Ambro | Ballotpedia

PHILADELPHIA – The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has unanimously affirmed that board members of the Tunkhannock Area School District Board did not violate the constitutional rights of one of its former elementary school principals, when the District fired him in 2016 for two incidents of driving under the influence.

Third Circuit judges Thomas L. Ambro, Kent A. Jordan and Stephanos Bibas ruled on Aug. 3 in favor of Tunkhannock Area School District Board Members Phillip Farr, William Weidner, John M. Burke, Frank P. Galicki, William Prebola, Holly Arnold, Robert J. Parry, III and William Swilley and against plaintiff Joseph P. Moffitt.

Moffitt was an elementary school principal with the Tunkhannock Area School District. In September 2016, the School District fired him for two driving-under-the-influence incidents. After losing his appeals with the Pennsylvania Secretary of Education and the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, Moffitt filed a federal lawsuit claiming violations of his constitutional rights.

Ambro explained that Moffitt received several hearings before his termination. First, the School District held a pre-disciplinary hearing where he was represented by counsel. After the School District recommended Moffitt’s dismissal, its Board of School Directors held two evidentiary hearings, where several witnesses testified in support of the District. The Board then voted to terminate Moffitt’s employment.

On his first appeal, Pennsylvania’s Secretary of Education affirmed his termination and the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania upheld the Secretary’s decision.

“Moffitt filed suit in federal court against the School District, the Board and members of the Board in their individual and official capacities. The District Court dismissed most of the first complaint with prejudice, holding that the claims against the District, the Board, and individual defendants in their official capacities were barred by the claim preclusion doctrine. However, the Court allowed Moffitt to amend his complaint against Board member defendants in their individual capacities,” Ambro said.

“The amended complaint asserts four separate counts – two counts alleging violations of Moffitt’s due process and equal protection rights, one count for First Amendment retaliation, and one count for wrongful suspension and termination under state law. Concluding the issue preclusion doctrine bars Moffitt’s amended complaint, the District Court dismissed it. Moffitt appeals to us.”

Ambro explained that to determine the preclusive effect of a prior Pennsylvania case, the Third Circuit would apply the same preclusion test that a Commonwealth court would apply.

“Pennsylvania follows well-settled elements for applying the issue preclusion doctrine (also known as collateral estoppel), which bars re-litigation of an issue from a previous action if: (1) The issue decided in the prior case is identical to the one presented in the later action; (2) There was a final adjudication on the merits; (3) The party against whom the plea is asserted was a party or in privity with a party in the prior case; (4) The party or person privy to the party against whom the doctrine is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding; and (5) The determination in the prior proceeding was essential to the judgment,” Ambro stated.

Ambro said that the Third Circuit agreed with the District Court that all the requirements for applying issue preclusion are met, and that each issue raised in Moffitt’s amended complaint was resolved by the Pennsylvania court.

“Moffitt argues that issue preclusion is inappropriate because he was required to exhaust his state administrative remedies before filing a federal action. We disagree, as he could have told the Commonwealth Court he wanted to reserve litigation of his federal claims, but he did not,” Ambro said.

“Moffitt also argues that the District Court should have converted the appellees’ motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. We see no indication that the Court abused its discretion by declining to convert. It based its decision on the issue preclusion doctrine and did not consider any facts introduced by the appellees in their motion to dismiss. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Moffitt’s amended complaint.”

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit case 20-3215

U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania case 3:19-cv-00899

From the Pennsylvania Record: Reach Courts Reporter Nicholas Malfitano at nick.malfitano@therecordinc.com

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