PHILADELPHIA – A local woman who claimed she was falsely arrested by Philadelphia authorities for firearms permit violations and later brought to trial, where she was ultimately found not guilty due to the fact that her permit was still active when she was taken into custody, has lost her case.
Desjanava Kinslow first filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on Feb. 4 versus the City of Philadelphia, ADA John Doe and John Doe Officers 1-2. All parties are of Philadelphia.
“On Feb. 3, 2020, Kinslow was pulled over by defendant Officers John Doe 1-2 for an alleged motor vehicle code violation. Upon the officers’ request, Kinslow informed them that she did have a firearm on her person for which she had licensure. Defendant Officers John Doe 1-2 alleged that her concealed carry status was revoked effective Sept. 4, 2019 and as a result, Kinslow was arrested and charged with firearms violations,” the suit said.
“On Dec. 7, 2021 at trial, defendant ADA John Doe pursued a third-degree felony charge of ‘Firearms Not to be Carried without License’ against Kinslow. On that same day, Kinslow was found Not Guilty by the Honorable Judge George Anthony Kyriakakis, due to her license not being legally suspended on Feb. 3, 2020. Despite the lack of evidence and viable case against Kinslow, defendants pursued prosecution in order to deny Kinslow her civil rights, falsely arrest her and deny her due process of the law. During the time of her trial as well as after her acquittal, Kinslow continues to struggle to find employment due to these charges.”
The plaintiff alleged that the City is liable for the acts of defendants Officers John Doe 1-2 and ADA John Doe because, “as a matter of policy and practice, it has tolerated and permitted the pattern of deprivation of constitutional rights by its police and prosecution at the expense of the constitutional rights of plaintiff and those similarly situated.”
“As a direct result of the defendants’ unconstitutional actions, plaintiff suffered serious economic and other injuries in the form of attorneys’ fees incurred, emotional distress, wage loss, embarrassment, and time spent to defend the case for which plaintiff seeks compensation. At no time relevant to this action did plaintiff engage in any criminal behavior justifying defendants’ actions,” the suit stated.
“The actions and/or omissions of defendants Officers John Doe 1-2 and ADA John Doe through their employment by City Of Philadelphia, were committed deliberately, intentionally, maliciously and willfully. The damages suffered by plaintiff were the direct and proximate result of the conduct of the defendants jointly, severally, directly or vicariously.”
On March 8, the City filed a motion to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim.
“In the absence of any unconstitutional statute or rule, it is the plaintiff’s burden to articulate a factual basis that demonstrates considerably more proof than a single incident. Here, plaintiff has not done so. Indeed, plaintiff has failed to set forth even a single other instance in which an individual was allegedly maliciously prosecuted or falsely arrested as she, let alone under similar circumstances. Absent factual allegations to support a plausible inference of a widespread pattern of deliberate indifference, dismissal of plaintiff’s municipal-liability claim is warranted,” the dismissal motion stated, in part.
“Further, although plaintiff also invokes boilerplate language regarding failures to ‘train’, ‘supervise,’ and/or ‘discipline,’ these allegations cannot save plaintiff’s claim from dismissal. To start, plaintiff’s ‘conclusory allegations of failure to train are deficient…because [plaintiff has] alleged nothing suggesting a failure to train,’ and plaintiff has failed to ‘specify the particular manner in which such training supposedly fell short. Further, reliance on these theories to establish Monell liability requires a showing of patterns of constitutional misconduct sufficient to put the policymaker on notice of the alleged training, supervision, or discipline deficiencies.”
Additionally, the City argued that the plaintiff has failed to support her claim with sufficient supporting factual allegations of a policy, custom or practice of the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office, and that dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim against the City for punitive damages is nonetheless appropriate, since case law states that punitive damages are not available against a city under U.S.C. 42 Section 1983.
Along with an amended complaint, the plaintiff filed a response to the dismissal motion on March 29. While Kinslow conceded that the Monell claim should be dismissed, she maintained that the remainder of her claims should be retained.
“The defendant’s 12(b)(6) motion asks that all claims be dismissed; however, the claims delineated are well-plead and should be liberally construed in the plaintiff’s favor such that dismissal of the claims is not warranted at this stage,” per the response brief.
“[Furthermore], punitive damages are appropriate because City officials recklessly disregarded plaintiff Kinslow’s rights through her initial illegal arrest and detention, and such reckless disregard for her rights continued through her prosecution until the time when she was found Not Guilty. The need for punitive damages in this case is tied to the deprivation of rights plaintiff Kinslow endured during the time she was being prosecuted for a baseless offense, where her concealed carry license was not legally suspended on the date of the stop. As a result of the deprivation of her rights, plaintiff Kinslow faced significant economic and other injuries in the form of attorneys’ fees incurred, emotional distress, wage loss, embarrassment and time spent to defend the case for which plaintiff seeks compensation.”
On May 3, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania Judge Timothy J. Savage dismissed the City and all claims against it from the case.
“Upon consideration of the defendant the City of Philadelphia’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s amended complaint for failure to state a claim, and the plaintiff’s oral response at the preliminary pretrial conference, it is ordered that the motion is granted. It is further ordered that all claims against the defendant the City of Philadelphia are dismissed with prejudice,” Savage said.
Furthermore, defendant Officers Francisco and Woolner, were also dismissed from the case the same day, in addition to several counts from the suit.
“Upon consideration of the first amended civil action complaint and the parties’ arguments at the preliminary pre-trial conference, it is ordered as follows: 1) Plaintiff’s first amended civil action complaint is dismissed with prejudice as to the defendants Officer Francisco No. 7220 and Officer Woolner No. 9981; and 2) Counts II, III, VI and VII of plaintiff’s first amended civil action complaint are dismissed with prejudice,” Savage added.
These counts were false arrest, civil conspiracy, state law negligent infliction of emotional distress and state law intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Counsel for defendant Farraye filed a motion to be dismissed from the case on June 13.
“Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be dismissed with prejudice because all of her claims are barred by absolute immunity. The challenged actions concern ADA Farraye’s decision to pursue prosecution. His evaluation of the case, his decision to try the case, and the manner in which he tried the case are the essence of the prosecutor’s role as advocate for the Commonwealth. At a minimum, ADA Farraye’s actions are shielded by qualified immunity because he did not violate a clearly established right. There are no cases that hold that a prosecutor cannot pursue an unlawful gun possession case even if he has some reason to believe that the criminal defendant may not have had notice of her permit’s revocation,” Farraye’s dismissal motion stated.
“Moreover, plaintiff cannot state a plausible claim for relief for malicious prosecution or for due process violations. After plaintiff’s conclusory statements concerning ADA Farraye’s motives are discarded, all that remains in her complaint is the allegation that ADA Farraye represented the Commonwealth at trial, ‘despite plaintiff’s case not being legally viable,’ and that she was acquitted. Even if plaintiff were to amend her complaint to add new factual allegations, her claims would still fail because she cannot show that the proceeding was initiated without probable cause; a judge had already found that probable cause existed, and ADA Farraye presented a certificate stating that plaintiff did not possess a valid gun permit on the date of her arrest. Further, she was never subjected to a seizure through the prosecution, having posted bail immediately. For these reasons, plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed with prejudice.”
UPDATE
On July 7, Savage granted Farraye’s dismissal motion with prejudice and thus, rendered the case as a whole in favor of the defense.
“Upon consideration of the motion to dismiss plaintiff’s amended complaint on behalf of ADA Adam Farraye and plaintiff not having filed a response in opposition, it is ordered that the motion is granted. It is further ordered that the plaintiff’s first amended civil action complaint is dismissed with prejudice as to defendant ADA Adam Farraye,” Savage said.
The plaintiff was represented by Evan T.L. Hughes of Hughes Firm, in Philadelphia.
The defendants were represented by Joshua Bernard Niemtzow of the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office.
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania case 2:22-cv-00468
From the Pennsylvania Record: Reach Courts Reporter Nicholas Malfitano at nick.malfitano@therecordinc.com