HARRISBURG – The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has upheld long-standing precedent that an organization which hosted an event at which alcohol was provided, but who was not a liquor licensee, could not be assigned liability for injuries caused by a guest who became intoxicated at the event.
In an Aug. 22 ruling, state Supreme Court Justices David N. Wecht, Debra Todd, Christine Donohue, Kevin M. Dougherty and P. Kevin Brobson chose to affirm prior decisions from the Superior Court of Pennsylvania and the Lawrence County Court of Common Pleas, in the matter of plaintiff David Klar versus defendants Dairy Farmers of America, Inc. and Roger J. Williams.
Wecht authored the state Supreme Court’s ruling in this case, and Justice Sallie Updyke Mundy did not participate in its consideration or resolution.
Klar claimed he sustained serious injuries after Williams’s car collided with his motorcycle in August 2014. Williams, a Dairy Farmers of America employee, had become intoxicated at a work-sponsored outing to Tanglewood Golf Course.
At the event, employees contributed money to offset the cost of activities, food and alcohol – with one of those employees being Williams. Klar alleged the DFA served Williams alcohol and violated the law when it continued to do so after Williams became intoxicated. Furthermore, Klar argued the DFA should have been aware that Williams had a rap sheet for a past drunk driving offense.
The crux of Klar’s argument was that because it asked for money to offset event costs, the DFA assumed liability and the role of a licensed vendor of alcohol. However, the DFA disagreed and filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
“DFA ultimately filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that it could not be held liable for Klar’s injuries because it was not a ‘licensee’ for purposes of the Liquor Code, that it did not take on ‘licensee status’ by virtue of the funds it collected to pay for the golf outing and that it was instead merely a ‘social host’ that was not responsible for the actions of its guest,” Wecht said.
“Because DFA was not licensed to sell alcohol, it appeared to fit into the latter category. However, the trial court recognized that Klar had at least plausibly suggested that DFA’s collection of funds from its employees could constitute a ‘sale’ of alcohol or the receipt of ‘remuneration’ for it. Indeed, the Liquor Code defines a ‘sale’ broadly to ‘include any transfer of liquor, alcohol or malt or brewed beverages for a consideration.’ Given this wide-ranging definition, the trial court reasoned that ‘collective action to purchase alcohol presents a problem of consistency’ with the proposition that social hosts are not exposed to liability.”
Ultimately, the Lawrence County Court of Common Pleas granted the motion and dismissed Klar’s claims against DFA. On appeal, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania upheld the trial court ruling and once again dismissed Klar’s complaint, leading him to appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Wecht found that Klar’s argument “effectively divides into two claims, one premised upon the Dram Shop Act and decisions interpreting it, and one invoking common-law negligence principles.”
“The trial court was entirely correct to conclude that, in order to establish a basis for Dram Shop liability, the plaintiff must show that the defendant ‘is either a licensee, or stepped into the shoes of a licensee,’ and that here, the absence of ‘profit or other indicia of commercial sale of liquor’ renders the Dram Shop Act inapplicable to DFA. To be even more precise, we conclude that the absence of such indicia of commercial designs means that DFA does not fall into the category of a ‘licensee or the board, or any employee, servant or agent of such licensee or of the board, or ‘any other person,” Wecht said.
“We further endorse the Superior Court’s ‘collective purchase’ rationale to the extent that it concluded that the collection of money from one’s companions to purchase alcohol for the group is not akin to an unlawful ‘sale’ of alcohol without a license. This is an entirely sensible proposition, for it would be absurd to conclude that there is a legally significant difference between, on the one hand, a person giving another $20 to support purchase of a $40 bottle of liquor for them to share, and on the other, both individuals handing a liquor store cashier $20 from their respective wallets or pocketbooks. The former scenario obviously does not transform the purchaser into a bootlegger or a bartender.”
Wecht added that, even in the absence of Dram Shop Act liability, Klar’s arguments in the area of common-law negligence “fare no better in that realm” and are “foreclosed by long-standing and well-established precedent that we find no reason to disturb.”
“The expansion of potential civil liability to all persons in this Commonwealth who host a gathering involving alcohol would be a policy decision of vast magnitude, the consequences and costs of which would be significant, widespread and not entirely predictable. Ordinary people do not undertake the legal duties and social obligations of liquor licensees merely by hosting a party, not even if they purchase alcohol together or reimburse each other for it. To the extent that Klar suggests that the proposed duty could be restricted to employers, and that an employment relationship imposes some increased obligation vis-à-vis the provision of alcohol, we find no common-law basis for such a distinction when neither employer nor employee are engaged in the business of selling alcohol. As such, we decline Klar’s invitation to modify the common law of social host liability,” Wecht stated.
“The lower courts did not err in concluding that DFA’s act of purchasing and providing beer for the golf outing was insufficient, as a matter of law, to trigger civil liability exposure for the injuries caused by its intoxicated guest. This result is the same under both the Dram Shop Act and common-law negligence…we defer to the General Assembly, and remind that, if our interpretation of the Dram Shop Act is inconsistent with the legislature’s intent, or if it wishes to supersede the approach that we apply under the common law, it may amend the statute accordingly. The order of the Superior Court is affirmed.”
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania case 29 WAP 2022
Superior Court of Pennsylvania 1280 WDA 2020
Lawrence County Court of Common Pleas case 2015-10863
From the Pennsylvania Record: Reach Courts Reporter Nicholas Malfitano at nick.malfitano@therecordinc.com