HARRISBURG – The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania has dismissed a petition from a group of inmates incarcerated at SCI-Phoenix, who sought to challenge the state and federal constitutionality of their sentences of life without the possibility of parole.
On Sept. 8, Commonwealth Court judges Patricia A. McCullough, Ellen Ceisler and Bonnie Brigance Leadbetter opted to deny the petitioners’ requested injunctive relief, with Leadbetter having authored the Court’s opinion in this matter.
Representing themselves, petitioners Kevin S. Mines, Lonnie Wright, James Brown, Charles Sheppard, Kevin Evans, Brian Thompson, Thomas Davis and Joel Muir, all of whom are inmates currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Phoenix, sought declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to their sentences of life imprisonment without parole (LWOP).
The petition was directed to former Pennsylvania Gov. Tom Wolf, current Pennsylvania Gov. Josh Shapiro, Parole Board Secretary Theodore W. Johnson, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Secretary George M. Little, SCI-Phoenix Superintendent Jaime Sorber and SCI-Phoenix Inmate Records Supervisor Kim Nixon.
“Petitioners have each been convicted and sentenced to LWOP for the crime of murder. Their convictions were obtained decades ago and, as of the filing of the petition, they have served between 13 and 43 years. Notwithstanding their sentences of LWOP, each petitioner submitted a parole application to the Pennsylvania Parole Board,” Leadbetter said.
“The Board’s individual correspondence to petitioners denying their applications all contain the following language: ‘Upon review of your application for parole and the Department of Corrections’ records of your sentencing, it appears that you are serving a life sentence and are therefore not eligible for parole consideration based upon Section 6137(a) of the Prisons and Parole Code (Code), 61 Pa.C.S. Section 6137(a).’ That section of the Code provides, in pertinent part, that ‘the Board may parole…any offender to whom the power to parole is granted to the Board by this chapter, except an offender condemned to death or serving life imprisonment.”
The petitioners then asserted several state and federal constitutional claims, including that their sentences of LWOP “violate their equal protection and due process rights, are grossly disproportionate to any penological interest being served constitute cruel and unusual punishment, and that they are unlawfully being subjected to an ex post facto law.”
The petitioners further claimed that the above-quoted “boilerplate response” they received from the Board denying their parole applications “violates their equal protection and due process rights, the process they received before the Board was arbitrary and capricious, and that they are being improperly incarcerated without a valid and authentic commitment form or sentencing order.”
“Respondents filed preliminary objections asserting that petitioners are essentially challenging the constitutionality of their sentences. As such, their claims sound in the nature of applications for post-conviction relief, over which this Court lacks jurisdiction. In addition, respondents argue that the petition should be dismissed, rather than transferred to a Court of Common Pleas, because pro se inmates cannot initiate a class action, respondents are not proper parties, petitioners failed to exhaust their statutory remedies under the Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) and the petition fails to state a valid claim upon which relief can be granted,” Leadbetter stated.
“Of particular note, petitioners argue in their brief in opposition that respondents’ preliminary objection for lack of jurisdiction ‘is based on a fundamental mischaracterization of the nature of’ their petition and the claims asserted therein. Petitioners attempt to backtrack or reframe their claims, maintaining that the petition should not be interpreted as a writ of habeas corpus or a PCRA petition. Petitioners repeatedly assert that they are not challenging the legality or constitutionality of their sentences; rather, they are challenging the ‘boilerplate’ determinations of the Board denying them any meaningful opportunity of review for parole and ‘the Department of Corrections’ denial of constitutional rights.’ In addition, petitioners argue that they pleaded sufficient facts to meet all the prerequisites for a class action.”
However, Leadbetter found that, contrary to the petitioners’ claims, they were in fact challenging their sentences and eligibility for parole.
“In sum, based upon the claims raised and relief sought, we find that petitioners are squarely challenging the constitutionality of their LWOP sentences and parole eligibility. Petitioners ‘may not collaterally attack their sentences by using a civil action in this Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.’ Instead, petitioners’ proper recourse is to pursue post-conviction relief in accordance with the requirement of the PCRA. Accordingly, we sustain respondents’ preliminary objection for lack of jurisdiction. As noted in…Section 5103(a) of the Judicial Code, [it] provides that normally a court shall not dismiss an erroneously filed matter for lack of jurisdiction, but shall transfer the case to the proper tribunal. Notwithstanding this general rule, we agree with respondents that transfer would be inappropriate and a waste of judicial resources, for the reasons noted in their remaining preliminary objections,” Leadbetter said.
“First, respondents are not proper parties to the action, as it is the Commonwealth that participates in post-conviction proceedings. Second, it is well established that pro se inmates may not initiate a class action lawsuit ‘in large part due to the fact that an individual without the proper level of legal education and experience is singularly ill-equipped to represent the interests of others in a court of law. Third, PCRA petitions must be brought individually as they are docketed in the Court of Common Pleas where the inmates were sentenced, ‘at the same term and number as the underlying conviction and sentence.’ Here, petitioners admit that they were sentenced in various Courts of Common Pleas, specifically those of Philadelphia, Chester, Allegheny and Montgomery Counties. Therefore, any PCRA petitions must be individually filed by each petitioner in his respective sentencing court.”
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania case 102 M.D. 2022
From the Pennsylvania Record: Reach Courts Reporter Nicholas Malfitano at nick.malfitano@therecordinc.com