ALLENTOWN – An inmate at the Lehigh County Jail, who claimed she was severely beaten and assaulted by her cellmate with alleged mental health issues and violent tendencies and who had been denied her regimen of medication to control those same issues, has had the default judgment granted to her set aside by a federal court.
Kristin Pantzar of Sweet Valley first filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on Aug. 7 versus the County of Lehigh, Warden Kyle A. Russell, Director of Corrections Janine Donate, Unidentified Agents and Employees of the County of Lehigh, John and Jane Does 1-10 and Unidentified Employees, Agents and Correction Officers of the Lehigh County Jail, John and Jane Does 11-20.
“On May 1, 2022, a 23-year-old female, ‘C.P.’, was arrested by the City of Bethlehem Police Department and charged with the following offenses: Felony aggravated assault on a police officer, the disarming of a police officer; terroristic threats; simple assault on a police officer, and harassment. In a sworn affidavit to the criminal complaint filed by BPD, a BPD Officer set forth the following facts that occurred on May 1, 2022: a) Two BPD officers responded to a call regarding a ‘female experiencing a mental health crisis’; Upon their arrival they spoke with two civilian victims of an assault by C.P.; C.P. gabbed one civilian witness from behind and started hitting her multiple times and ripped her clothes; C.P. then struck the second civilian witness on the arm; When approached by the two BPD Officers, C.P. stated that she ‘felt like killing people today,” the suit said.
“One officer attempted to defuse the situation, but C.P. responded that she was going to take his firearm and shoot him. C.P. then reached for the officer’s weapon; During a struggle with C.P. while taking her into custody, C.P. struck and caused abrasions to the police officer; While in custody, C.P. attempted to bite the police officer and kicked him in his left leg; When another officer went to assist his fellow officer, C.P. attempted to bite him also and kicked him in his right leg; C.P. spit at EMS personnel when they arrived; and the officers then observed that C.P. had violently damaged a group home where she resided, causing structural damage to the interior wall of the residence; tore down window blinds, damaged a television and lamp, and threw a coffee table into the wall.”
The suit added C.P. was incarcerated on the foregoing charges at the Northampton County Prison (NCP), and that the institution was “fully aware of the nature of C.P.’s charged offenses and her mental health issues and violent propensities.”
“In addition to being the healthcare provider at the Lehigh County Jail (LCJ), PrimeCare also served as the healthcare provider for inmates at NCP, and was aware of C.P.’s mental health issues, her violent propensities and her medication needs, and was required to document that information, as well as information concerning their administration of necessary drugs to C.P., while she was in NCP. custody. When inmates, such as C.P., are transferred from NCP. to LCJ, information concerning the inmate, including the nature of pending charges and the dangerous propensities of the inmate, the inmate’s mental health status and other pertinent information is made available to the receiving prison facility (i.e. LCJ) (as well as PrimeCare). This is also required under regulations prescribed in Pennsylvania’s Administrative Code, and well-established national correctional standards and safeguards, including those adopted by the American Correctional Association, which require this information to be determined and documented upon an inmate’s admission into any County Correctional Facility,” the suit stated.
“Lehigh County and LCJ employees, and the Warden and Director of Corrections had both actual and constructive knowledge of the dangerous propensities of C.P. and the need to keep her segregated from other inmates such as the plaintiff. PrimeCare, Lehigh County’s in-house, subordinate, contractual healthcare provider, was also aware of the mental health issues of C.P. and of her continued need to be administered drugs in an uninterrupted fashion in an attempt to moderate or eliminate her violent propensities, the danger she presented to others and the consequences which this has for C.P.’s classification and housing. In fact, PrimeCare provided medical services to inmates at both Northampton County Prison and the Lehigh County Jail and, interchangeably employed personnel at both correctional institutions who were obligated to share that critical information with the defendants.”
Despite the fact that C.P. should not have been housed in the jail’s general population, about three days after her transfer to LCJ, the defendants placed C.P. into the same locked cell as that occupied by the unsuspecting plaintiff – and furthermore, allegedly did not warn the plaintiff of C.P.’s violent propensities nor provide C.P. with her required regimen of medication.
“The following day, on or about June 10, 2022, while the plaintiff was asleep in her bed, she was suddenly and for no reason viciously assaulted by C.P., who put a blanket over the plaintiff’s head, stating that she wanted ‘to kill somebody,’ and thereafter started to smash plaintiff’s head repeatedly into the cinder block wall of their cell, while otherwise also beating her about her person and scratching, and biting her. C.P. also tried to pull the plaintiff off of her top bunk onto the cement floor below. The plaintiff was beaten so badly that the cell was a bloody mess and she is believed to have lost consciousness for an unknown period of time,” the suit added.
“Despite plaintiff’s screams for help and cries of pain, there was no correctional officer in the vicinity when she was so brutally beaten by C.P. When correctional officers finally arrived after an inexcusably long delay, C.P. then also started to assault the officers. Within the first 10 minutes after the assault on the plaintiff, the seriously battered and injured plaintiff started losing sight in her right eye.”
On Sept. 5, plaintiff counsel filed a praecipe for entry of default against the defendants.
“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a) provides that the Clerk of Court shall enter the default of a party against whom a judgment for relief is sought if that party fails to plead or otherwise defend. Plaintiff filed her complaint in this matter on Aug. 7, 2023. On Aug. 10, 2023, plaintiff personally served a summons and a copy of the complaint on defendants. Proof of service upon defendants was filed with the Court, in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(l), on Aug. 21, 2023,” the praecipe stated.
“Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a), defendants were required to serve an answer to or otherwise defend the complaint within 21 days of receiving the summons and complaint, or by Aug. 31, 2023. As of the date of this filing, defendants have failed to answer or otherwise respond to the complaint filed against them. Plaintiff states, based on the records in this case, that none of the defendants is an infant, incompetent, or a member of the armed forces, such that Section 200 of the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940, 50 U.S.C. Appendix Section 520, would apply.”
Two days later, the Clerk of Court entered the default against the defendants on Sept. 7.
“Default is entered pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a) against defendants County of Lehigh, Director of Corrections Janine Donate and Kyle A. Russell for failure to plead or otherwise defend,” Clerk of Court George Wylesol said.
UPDATE
On Sept. 12, defendants County of Lehigh, Russell and Donate filed a motion to set aside the granted default judgment, for what they said was good cause.
“Addressing the first consideration for demonstrating ‘good cause,’ setting aside the default results in no prejudice to plaintiff. In the present matter, moving defendants intend to file a response to the complaint by Friday, Sept. 15, 2023. Assuming that proper service of the complaint occurred on Aug. 10, 2023, only a mere 15 days will have passed since the 21-day deadline prescribed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a). There is no indication here, especially given the incredibly minimal amount of time that has passed, that any evidence is at risk of being lost or that plaintiff’s ability to pursue her claim has been impaired. Accordingly, this factor supports a finding of good cause to set aside the default,” the defendants said.
“Addressing the second consideration for demonstrating ‘good cause,’ moving defendants have meritorious defenses that justify setting aside the default. In the present matter, and as will be reflected in moving defendants’ forthcoming response to the complaint, moving defendants deny plaintiff’s claims and maintain meritorious defenses. Plaintiff’s complaint asserts two claims: Count I – 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Violation – Duty to Protect/Monell Liability; and Count II – Direct Negligence and Vicarious Liability – State Claim. The first claim invokes a deliberate indifference standard. Moving defendants did not know and were not aware of any excessive risk to inmate safety associated with CP as alleged in the complaint. Similarly, moving defendants deny and dispute any negligent conduct and deny any intentional, reckless, or deliberate disregard for the health, safety, and welfare of plaintiff. The investigation performed by moving defendants thus far on the alleged incident yields evidence to support these notions and the absence of the requisite knowledge of moving defendants needed by plaintiff to prevail on her claims. Moving defendants believe the evidence once fully developed during discovery will demonstrate an absence of liability on these claims if the default is set aside.”
The defendants in question also argued they were not culpable, due to alleged improper service of the complaint.
As a result, the defense’s motion to set aside the default was granted on Sept. 14 and those same defendants answered the complaint four days later, on Sept. 18.
“Plaintiff’s claims are barred in whole or in part by the applicable statute of limitations. Plaintiff’s complaint fails to set forth a claim, in whole or in part, upon which relief can be granted. No act or failure to act on the part of answering defendants violated any of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. At all times material hereto, plaintiff was afforded all rights, privileges and immunities granted pursuant to the Constitution and laws of the United States and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Plaintiff suffered no injury or damages as a result of any acts or omissions by answering defendant,” the answer’s affirmative defenses stated, in part.
“Any injury or damage allegedly sustained by plaintiff was a direct and proximate result of plaintiff’s and/or a third-party’s conduct over which answering defendants had no control. At no time material hereto did answering defendants act in bad faith or wantonly, recklessly, or maliciously, or with a disregard for plaintiff’s health, safety and welfare. At no time material hereto were answering defendants deliberately indifferent to the constitutional rights of plaintiff or third-parties. Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages is limited and/or barred by the applicable state constitution, the Fourteenth, Fifth and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution and by the laws of the United States and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Merely negligent or careless conduct on the part of a state actor is insufficient to maintain a cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and other applicable state and federal law. Answering defendants are immune from all or part of the claims set forth in plaintiff’s complaint.”
For counts of due process violations under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and Monell, plus negligence and vicarious liability, the plaintiff is seeking compensatory damages and punitive damages, jointly and severally, in excess of $150,000, exclusive of interest and costs; reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, an order enjoining defendants from engaging in the future in the conduct identified in the complaint as violative of 42 U.S.C. Sections 1983, 1988, the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, and cognate sections of the Pennsylvania Constitution; policies that are calculated and intended to preclude the conduct alleged to have been engaged in by the defendants named herein and providing for the independent monitoring and reporting of same and such other and further relief, as this Court may deem appropriate.
The plaintiff was represented by Robert E. Goldman of the Law Office of Robert E. Goldman, in Allentown.
The defendants are represented by Samuel Ezra Cohen of Gross McGinley, also in Allentown.
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania case 5:23-cv-03024
From the Pennsylvania Record: Reach Courts Reporter Nicholas Malfitano at nick.malfitano@therecordinc.com