PITTSBURGH – After a local doctor, obstetrics and gynecology practice and a hospital were denied their preliminary objections in response to a wrongful death suit from a Sewickley couple that charged their collective negligence led to the death of a baby girl over one year ago, those same medical defendants have provided additional arguments which deny the plaintiffs’ assertions.
Suzanna C. Quinn and Robert M. Quinn (individually and as Administrators of the Estate of Christene Elizabeth Ann Quinn) first filed suit in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas on Aug. 15 versus Rebecca Welch, M.D., Tri-State Obstetrics and Gynecology, Inc. (doing business as “OB/GYN Associates of Sewickley”) and Heritage Valley Sewickley Hospital. All parties are of Sewickley.
“In the summer of 2022, the plaintiffs were expecting their daughter, Baby Christene, to be born in November 2022. On June 15, 2022, plaintiff Mother presented to Allegheny Perinatal Associates for an ultrasound that demonstrated normal fetal anatomy. On Aug. 8, 2022, plaintiff Mother presented to Allegheny Perinatal Associates at 29 weeks and one-day gestational age for an ultrasound that revealed a healthy baby with demonstrated a fetal weight of 1550 g, amniotic fluid index of 18.0 cm, and fetal growth estimate at the 78th percentile,” the suit said.
“On the morning of Sept. 4, 2022, plaintiff Mother presented to Heritage Valley Sewickley at 31 weeks and 4 days gestational age with complaints of nausea and vomiting. At that time, defendant Hospital advertised and held itself out as capable and qualified to evaluate, diagnose, and treat pregnant patients. At that time, defendant Hospital advertised that it maintained excellent relationships with referral hospitals in Pittsburgh, such that pregnant mothers in need of higher level of care could and would be stabilized and transferred as necessary. At that time, defendant Practice maintained an office within defendant Hospital. Plaintiff Mother was placed on a fetal heart monitor at or about 9:10 a.m. Plaintiff Mother was documented as COVID positive, with Type 2 diabetes that she treated with insulin.”
The suit added on that day, at no point did defendant Welch meet, evaluate and/or assess plaintiff Mother in person, nor did defendant Hospital ensure that a qualified physician met, evaluated, and/or assessed plaintiff Mother in person.
“Lab work from plaintiff Mother’s encounter revealed numerous abnormal results indicatives of ketoacidosis, including CO2 of 7 mmol/L (which was a critical result that was repeated), anion gap of 25 mmol/L, creatinine of 0.9 mg/dL, a urine protein to creatinine ratio of 0.58, and 4+ ketones on urinalysis. On information and belief, some or all of defendant Hospital’s healthcare providers noted the sweet smell of acetone – a sign of high levels of ketones in the blood — emanating from plaintiff Mother,” the suit stated.
“Defendant Welch documented that, ‘Attempted vaginal exam but patient not able to tolerate however cervix not palpated and had not palpated. Patient’s blood pressures here were stable but she has a history in the past of pre-eclampsia. A spot urine was obtained and was 0.58. She will be sent home with 24-hour urine however due to her urinary tract infection and ketonuria as well as proteinuria likely more related to those things. She initially had 4+ ketones in her urine. Again, she was given IV fluids and insulin as well as a dose of amoxicillin and started to tolerate clears.’ Defendant Welch knew plaintiff Mother had ketonuria in the setting of vomiting and was not taking her insulin. Defendant Welch knew plaintiff had an elevated anion gap. Defendant Welch knew infection in a patient with Type II diabetes is a risk factor for or conditions known to cause diabetic ketoacidosis. Defendant Welch knew nausea and vomiting in Type II diabetic with known infection are symptoms of or conditions known to cause diabetic ketoacidosis. Defendant Welch knew the failure to treat diabetic ketoacidosis in pregnancy and closely monitor the mother and fetus would increase the risk of death or serious injury to both the mother and fetus.”
Despite signs of decelerating heartbeat in the fetus, the suit said the plaintiff mother was discharged from Heritage Valley Sewickley Hospital and sent home in the mid-afternoon on Sept. 4, 2022.
The following day, Sept. 5, 2022, plaintiff mother presented to West Penn Hospital with complaints of decreased fetal movement and shortness of breath.
“At that time, plaintiff mother was found to have a non-reassuring fetal heart tracing with fetal bradycardia in the 80 to 90 beats per minute range without resolution. Plaintiff mother was taken for an emergency cesarean delivery. At birth, Baby Christene had Apgar scores of 1 and 0 at 1 and 5 minutes and birth weight of 2150g. Baby Christene was not able to be successfully resuscitated by pediatricians and died shortly after birth. Plaintiff mother and plaintiff father were in the immediate vicinity of Baby Christene’s birth and were present at or around the time of Baby Christene’s death. Intraoperatively, plaintiff mother was found to have euglycemic diabetic ketoacidosis,” the suit said.
“Plaintiff mother and plaintiff father were shocked, upset, traumatized, distressed and saddened by the loss of their daughter. Plaintiff mother was subsequently transferred to the intensive care unit where her diabetic ketoacidosis was treated and resolved. An endocrinology consult note stated, ‘Patient upon admission to the ICU was noted to have severe metabolic acidosis secondary to severe DKA likely in setting of pregnancy and COVID.’ The death certificate for Baby Christene listed perinatal asphyxia as the immediate cause of death. The death certificate also listed COVID infection, diabetes, and diabetic ketoacidosis (DKA) as causes of death. In the days following Baby Christene’s death, plaintiff mother reported to healthcare providers as being in a state of shock. ‘She states that she was able to sleep last night for a few hours but had been quite anxious and unsettled when awake. Some intrusive negative thoughts, some somatic symptoms of restlessness. Thoughts are distracting. Anxious about going home, stating they had just finished getting the baby's room ready.’ As a result of the negligence of the defendants, plaintiff mother and plaintiff father have been caused to suffer headaches, insomnia, depression, nightmares, nervousness, stress and/or anxiety.”
The defendants filed preliminary objections on Sept. 12, wanting counts of direct corporate negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress removed from the case for allegedly not being pled properly.
“In Count III of the complaint, plaintiffs attempt to set forth a corporate negligence claim against Tri-State and HV Sewickley. The factual allegations that plaintiffs have pled do not support a corporate negligence claim against these defendants. Therefore, said claim fails as a matter of law and as such, cannot proceed. However, a plaintiff must plead more than ‘blind suspicions and unsupported accusations’ when setting forth his claims. Rather, a plaintiff is required to plead the material facts that support their action,” the objections said.
“Plaintiff has failed to plead any facts or otherwise include any averments within the complaint asserting that defendants had actual or constructive notice of the alleged harm-causing defects. The allegations of the complaint make it clear that this claim is deficient against both Tri-State and the Hospital. There are no allegations of knowledge contained in Count III or otherwise in the complaint. As set forth above, knowledge to the corporate entity is absolutely crucial in the establishment of a claim for direct corporate negligence in the medical malpractice context. Because plaintiff has failed to allege anything beyond boilerplate knowledge by the corporate entities, Count III should be dismissed.”
Furthermore, the defendants said that the negligent infliction of emotional distress count was also improperly pled.
“At Counts V and VI, plaintiffs attempt to set forth claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress (one for plaintiff-mother and another for plaintiff-father). In order for a plaintiff-bystander to state a viable claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, such plaintiff must set forth that he contemporaneously observed the traumatic infliction of injury to a close relative at the defendant’s hand. As such, without a sensory observation of a traumatic infliction of an injury, a plaintiff is not entitled to damages for alleged emotional distress suffered from witnessing a child’s physical deterioration due to allegedly improper medical treatment,” the objections added.
“In the instant matter, there is no allegation that the plaintiffs witnessed the death of their child…instead, it is only alleged that they learned about (but did not witness) the death of the infant. Accordingly, there is no allegation that they witnessed ‘a traumatic infliction of an injury’ as required by the Pennsylvania case law As this Court can see, there is simply no theory of recovery on a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim which does not require a discreet traumatic event. The courts have routinely and repeatedly found that observing the medical or physical decline of a loved one, even due to admitted negligence, does not provide a discreet traumatic event. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress must be dismissed because said cause of action requires a discrete and identifiable traumatic event that caused the injuries for which they seek to recover, no such event occurred in this matter, and plaintiffs may not properly bring a cause of action under this theory of liability under Pennsylvania law.”
Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas Judge Arnold I. Klein issued a denial of the defense’s objections on Oct. 23.
“It is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed that defendants’ preliminary objections are denied,” Klein said.
UPDATE
On Nov. 13, the defendants filed an answer and new matter with respect to the plaintiffs’ claims.
“If plaintiffs sustained the injuries or damages alleged in their complaint, which are denied, it is averred that said injuries or damages were caused by the operation of nature and not by any acts or omissions on the part of this defendant. The injuries and/or damages sustained by plaintiffs, to the extent they are proven, were not caused by any negligent, tortious or actionable conduct on the part of answering defendants but were the result of factors, entities or causes beyond their control. To the extent the evidence shows the plaintiffs have failed to mitigate their damages, these defendants plead failure to mitigate damages as an affirmative defense. To the extent the evidence shows that plaintiffs were contributory or comparatively negligent, said negligence is pleaded as an affirmative defense,” per the new matter.
“For the purposes of preserving the same, and subject to further discovery, the answering defendants assert that plaintiff’s claims are barred by any releases that may have been executed in connection with plaintiff’s decedent’s treatment or for other purposes. Section 606 of the Healthcare Services Malpractice Act of Pennsylvania provides that in ‘the absence of a special contract in writing, a healthcare provider is neither a warrantor nor a guarantor of a cure.’ This provision is pleaded as an affirmative defense insofar as there was no special contract in writing in this case. These defendants raises all affirmative defenses set forth or available as a result of the provisions in the Healthcare Services Malpractice Act of Pennsylvania and/or House Bill 1802 (2002), as well as the Pennsylvania MCARE act.”
For counts of negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, survival and wrongful death, the plaintiffs are seeking damages in excess of the threshold amount for a board of arbitrators in this jurisdiction and demand a trial by jury.
The plaintiffs are represented by Brendan B. Lupetin and Gregory R. Unatin of Lupetin & Unatin, in Pittsburgh.
The defendants are represented by Michael C. Hamilton, Paula A. Koczan and Tiffany R. Temas of Weber Gallagher Simpson Stapleton Fires & Newby, also in Pittsburgh.
Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas case GD-23-009765
From the Pennsylvania Record: Reach Courts Reporter Nicholas Malfitano at nick.malfitano@therecordinc.com