PHILADELPHIA – Parent plaintiffs who claimed multiple officers from the Philadelphia Sheriff’s Department violated their civil rights when they executed a search warrant at their home in an attempt to find the plaintiffs’ son, who had been murdered five months before the search took place, have countered arguments from the City of Philadelphia that res judicata should bar their case.
Tysha Melton and Eliacin Juarbe first filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on Dec. 28, 2023 versus the City of Philadelphia, the Philadelphia Sheriff’s Department, Sheriff’s Department Chief Rochelle Bilal, Sheriff’s Department Sgt. Byron Hardman and Unknown Sheriff’s Department Officers. All parties are of Philadelphia.
“Travys Taylor, age 28 and plaintiffs’ son, was murdered by a masked gunman at a takeout restaurant in Kensington on Oct. 26, 2021. On Jan. 28, 2022, pending criminal charges against Taylor were dismissed in Pennsylvania court, and the docket was marked ‘Case Dismissed – Defendant Deceased,’ as reflected on Pennsylvania’s Common Pleas Case Management System database. On or about March 25, 2022, defendant Hardman selected an outstanding bench warrant for Taylor to be executed at plaintiffs’ residence. On March 25, 2022, defendant Hardman conducted four database searches, each designed to confirm that the target of a bench warrant likely resides at the target address and is not deceased or incarcerated,” the suit said.
“One of the said databases searched by defendant Hardman includes the CPCMS database, but the type of search ran by defendant Hardman failed to notify him that Taylor had been deceased for 4 months and 27 days, and the CPCMS system did, in fact, note that Taylor was deceased, at least as early as Jan. 28, 2022. On or about March 25, 2022, at 8:30 a.m., plaintiffs were asleep at their residence when there was a banging on the door. Plaintiff Juarbe peeked in their second-floor bedroom window, and viewed and heard various members of law enforcement in black tactical uniform yelling ‘Police! Police! Where is he?”
The suit added that the plaintiffs walked downstairs to the front door and when plaintiff Melton opened the door, more than a dozen officers physically forced their way inside with guns in hand, pushing plaintiff Melton’s lower back into her television stand and directly pointing their guns at the plaintiffs.
“Defendant officers eventually announced they were looking for plaintiffs’ son, Taylor. Taylor had a bench warrant for his arrest for failing to appear in court on marijuana and trespassing charges. Defendant officers searched the upstairs bedroom and found a memorial she built for him: Smiling photos of her son, and a replica of an Eagles helmet atop a box with his ashes,” the suit stated.
“After seeing their warrant was wrongful, defendant officers quickly left the house, covering their badges as they scrambled out the door. On March 25, 2022, and well before said date, defendants Hardman and Bilal were aware of numerous previous instances of the Philadelphia Sheriff’s Department executing search warrants for individuals who were deceased and failed to implement new policies designed to correct said past errors and/or oversights.”
Defense counsel filed a stipulation on Jan. 19 explaining that, along with the wishes of plaintiff counsel, Counts III and IV of the complaint (alleged violations of the Pennsylvania Constitution and negligent infliction of emotional distress) would be dismissed with prejudice, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii).
Four days later, on Jan. 23, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania Judge Joshua D. Wolson approved the stipulation and issued a judicial order to that effect.
In a Feb. 23 motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, the City argued that the res judicata dismissal of a state court case associated with these same events rendered the instant federal case moot.
“Plaintiffs’ complaint should be dismissed in its entirety for two independent reasons. First, because the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas granted defendants’ preliminary objections and dismissed the previous action with prejudice, and because the previous action and this matter concern the same underlying events, this subsequent federal action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Second and alternatively, even if the action were not barred in its entirety by res judicata, the only remaining counts (Counts I and II) fail to state a plausible violation of plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights, and even if they did, they fail to plausibly attribute such violation to a City policy, custom or failure to train as required to establish municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983,” the dismissal motion stated.
Defense counsel then addressed each reason in turn, beginning with res judicata.
“Here, the underlying events giving rise to the various claims in the two actions are the same: they are, in sum, the events surrounding warrant execution. Specifically, in both actions plaintiffs alleged that their son, Mr. Taylor, had died several months before the warrant execution, and yet the defendants failed to learn about his death before executing what was a moot warrant for his arrest. And in both actions plaintiffs alleged that the warrant execution led to plaintiff Melton being pushed into her television stand as the officers entered her residence, and the officers’ guns being pointed at plaintiffs,” the motion added.
“Because the underlying events giving rise to the two actions are the same, it does not matter for purposes of res judicata that, in the previous action, plaintiffs asserted only state law claims – for negligence, assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy/intrusion upon seclusion – whereas in this federal action plaintiffs asserted federal claims for constitutional violations under Section 1983. Again, the ‘specific legal theory invoked’ does not control; the similarity of the underlying facts does. Ultimately, because the claims involved the same underlying events, plaintiffs could have brought their Section 1983 claims based on the warrant execution in the previous action. But they did not do so, and, as a result, res judicata precludes them from doing so in a second action.”
Counsel for the defense then turned to the second reason for dismissal, in their view.
“Whether under the theory that the warrant execution was an unreasonable search because the bench warrant was mooted by Mr. Taylor’s death, or under the theory of excessive force, plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient facts which, if true, plausibly support a Fourth Amendment violation. For that reason, both plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim (Count I) and the derivative municipal liability claim (Count II) should be dismissed,” the dismissal motion said.
“Plaintiffs’ municipal liability claim (Count II) merely alleges in conclusory fashion that the City ‘failed to train and supervise defendant Hardman how to determine if the target of a search warrant is deceased.’ This conclusion is unsupported by any specific factual allegations, such as similar past conduct on the part of Sgt. Hardman or anyone else in the Sheriff’s Department. Accordingly, for this independent reason, Count II fails to state a plausible municipal liability claim.”
UPDATE
On March 7, the plaintiffs replied to the City’s dismissal motion and contended that the doctrine of res judicata has no bearing on the instant federal court case, since the four underlying conditions needed for res judicata to apply (as cited in Bearoff v. Bearoff Bros.) were not fulfilled.
These are: (1) Identity in the thing sued upon; (2) Identity of the cause of action; (3) Identity of the persons and parties to the action; and (4) Identity of the quality or capacity of the parties suing or being sued.
“The underlying events giving rise to the various claims in the two actions are different. The underlying events in the Court of Common Pleas action surround the warrant execution. In contrast, the underlying events in the instant action surround the fact that defendants failed to train and supervise Sgt. Hardman on how to determine if the target of a search warrant is deceased. In fact, defendants were aware of numerous previous instances of the Philadelphia Sheriff’s Department executing search warrants for individuals who were deceased and failed to implement new policies designed to correct said past errors and/or oversight,” the plaintiffs’ reply stated.
“As the underlying events giving rise to the claims in the two actions are not the same, the instant action is not barred under the doctrine of res judicata. Moreover, as described above, the identity of the thing sued upon, is different between the two actions. Therefore, the facts raised by plaintiffs in their complaint demonstrate a lack a concurrence of the four conditions as outlined in Bearoff and defendants’ motion must be denied.”
Moreover, the plaintiffs countered that they have properly pled violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, since they “have averred that more than a dozen officers physically forced their way inside with guns in hand, pushed Melton into her television stand and directly pointed their guns at the plaintiffs” – and a violation of municipal liability, through “alleging that the defendants were aware of numerous previous instances of the Philadelphia Sheriff’s Department executing search warrants for individuals who were deceased, and failed to implement new policies designed to correct said past errors and/or oversights.”
For counts of violating the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution plus negligent training and supervision, the plaintiffs are seeking compensatory, exemplary and punitive damages, actual damages, a declaration that the conduct and practices of the defendants are unlawful and to enjoin them from similar conduct, consequential damages, pre- and post-judgment interest, costs and attorney’s fees, and any and all other legal and/or equitable damages this Court sees fit to grant.
The plaintiffs are represented by Mary E. LeMieux-Fillery of the Law Offices of Eric A. Shore, in Philadelphia.
The defendants are represented by Adam Ross Zurbriggen of the City of Philadelphia Law Department’s Civil Rights Unit.
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania case 2:23-cv-05148
From the Pennsylvania Record: Reach Courts Reporter Nicholas Malfitano at nick.malfitano@therecordinc.com