WILLIAMSPORT – A woman running on a treadmill for a medically administered stress test and claimed that doctors ignoring her warnings that the speed of the treadmill was too fast and led her to fall and suffer a broken arm and other injuries, has arrived at a settlement agreement with the defendants.
Jane Shaner of Muncy first filed suit in the Lycoming County Court of Common Pleas on June 14, 2023 versus Nicholas Dalessandro, D.O., Timothy Albert Bradley, PA-C, UPMC, UPMC Williamsport, UPMC Susquehanna Health Hospitalist Service, Susquehanna Health Hospitalist At WRMC, Susquehanna Health Hospitalist Service, SPS Hospitalist Service, NCPHS Health Education (doing business as “Susquehanna Physician Services”), Susquehanna Physician Services and UPMC Health Services, all of Williamsport.
“On July 24, 2021, the plaintiff was 52 years old and was admitted to UPMC Williamsport with complaints of chest tightness and pain. At all times pertinent hereto, plaintiff had a past medical history which included hypertension and migraines. On July 25, 2021, plaintiff was undergoing a stress test on a treadmill. The stress test was ordered by defendant Timothy Albert Bradley, PA-C. Defendant Nicholas Dalessandro, D.O. was defendant Timothy Albert Bradley, PA-C’s supervising doctor at the time the stress test was ordered,” the suit said.
“While undergoing the stress test, the defendants’ agents, ostensible agents, servants, partners, workmen, and/or employees, and/or healthcare providers continued to increase the speed of the treadmill. When the speed of the treadmill was increased, the plaintiff informed the staff that she felt the treadmill was going too fast and that she could not keep up with the speed. Despite the plaintiff’s protests, the defendants’ agents, ostensible agents, servants, partners, workmen, and/or employees, and/or healthcare providers did not turn down the speed of the treadmill and/or stop the treadmill. As a result, the plaintiff fell on her left side.”
The suit added that immediately after the fall, the plaintiff experienced pain in her left knee and shoulder.
“As a result of the fall, plaintiff suffered a comminuted fracture of the left humeral head requiring open reduction, internal fixation, left knee pain, shoulder pain, and shock to her nerves and nervous system, all of which caused her and will continue to cause her for an indefinite period of time in the future, great pain, agony and suffering, both physical and mental. As a result of the negligent acts and omissions of the defendants as is more fully set forth herein at length, plaintiff sustained serious and permanent injuries,” the suit stated.
“As a direct and proximate result of the defendants’ departure from the standard of care and injuries sustained, plaintiff has been forced to undergo medical treatment and medical procedures including but not limited to diagnostic studies including: surgery, x-rays, medication, therapies and other expenses in an effort to treat and cure herself of the injuries sustained and she will be obliged to expend additional sums of money for the same purposes in the future because her injuries are permanent in nature. As a direct and proximate result of the negligent acts and omissions of the defendants as is more fully set forth here at length, plaintiff has expended, and will expend for an indefinite time in the future, various and substantial amounts of money for the medicine and medical attention in and about endeavoring to treat and cure herself of her injuries, all to her great financial loss and detriment.”
On July 17, 2023, the defendants filed a notice of intention to seek a judgment of non-pros based on failure to file a Certificate of Merit along with the complaint.
“Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1042.7, the undersigned intends to enter a judgment of non-pros against you after 30 days of the date of the filing of this notice if a Certificate of Merit is not filed as required by Rule 1042.3. I am serving this notice on behalf of defendants Nicholas Dalessandro, DO, Timothy Albert Bradley, PA-C, UPMC, UPMC Williamsport, UPMC Susquehanna Health Hospitalist Service, Susquehanna Health Hospitalist at WRMC, Susquehanna Health Hospitalist Service, SPS Hospitalist Service, NCPHS Health Education (doing business as “Susquehanna Physician Services”), Susquehanna Physician Services and UPMC Health Services,” the notice stated.
“The judgment of non-pros will be entered as to all claims against defendants Nicholas Dalessandro, DO, Timothy Albert Bradley, PA-C, UPMC, UPMC Williamsport, UPMC Susquehanna Health Hospitalist Service, Susquehanna Health Hospitalist at WRMC, Susquehanna Health Hospitalist Service, SPS Hospitalist Service, NCPHS Health Education (doing business as “Susquehanna Physician Services”), Susquehanna Physician Services and UPMC Health Services.”
The defendants then filed preliminary objections on preliminary objections on July 31, seeking to strike a litany of allegations of negligence – which the defendants argued were too general and ill-supported.
“With respect to all counts, plaintiff alleges identical negligent conduct respectively in Paragraphs 48, 60, 72, 84, 96, 108, 120, 132, 144, 156 and 168. In each of these above-referenced paragraphs, there are numerous open-ended, general averments of negligence, as follows: Negligently administering the cardiac stress test; Failure to ensure that equipment was up to standard; Failure to properly manage the plaintiff’s cardiac stress test; Failure to ensure the plaintiff’s safety during the procedure; Failure to provide adequate supervision during the procedure; Failure to recognize the significance of their patients’ condition; Failure to prevent harm to plaintiff; Failure to provide appropriate preventative medical services; Failure to conform to the requisite standards of care relative to plaintiff’s care; Failure to provide and render reasonable medical care to plaintiff,” the objections stated, in part.
“Failure to provide proper care to plaintiff; Failure to properly evaluate plaintiff; Failure to properly examine plaintiff; Failure to properly document plaintiff’s chart; Failure to fully and completely discuss plaintiff’s medical condition with plaintiff; Failure to properly perform all diagnostic testing necessary to properly assess, diagnose and treat plaintiff; Failure to consult appropriate medical specialists; Failure to provide proper care under the circumstances; Failure to make a proper and appropriate diagnosis and provide or order proper and appropriate treatment for plaintiff; Failure to have the proper qualifications to care for plaintiff; Failure to have the necessary qualifications to care for patient with plaintiff’s symptoms; Failure to remain abreast of current knowledge, thinking and/or techniques in the field of cardiology and or vascular medicine and in then and there failing to ensure timely and proper consultation in plaintiff’s case with appropriate healthcare providers and/or specialists.”
According to the defendants, those allegations “fail to contain sufficient facts to permit the defendants to adequately understand and defend the allegations contained in plaintiffs’ complaint, and plaintiffs could arguably assert new causes of action or theories of liability after the statute of limitations has expired under the guise of merely amplifying such open-ended and generalized averments” – and further, that “continued inclusion of the aforesaid conclusory allegations in plaintiffs’ complaint is prejudicial, in that defendants may be powerless to prevent plaintiffs from obtaining leave to amend the complaint to allege new and different theories of negligence, after the running of the two-year statute of limitations.”
In an Aug. 18, 2023 response to the preliminary objections, the plaintiff denied them in their entirety.
“It is denied that the cited averments fail to contain sufficient facts to permit the defendants to understand and defendant the allegations contained in plaintiff’s complaint. Further, the averments contained within the corresponding paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. By way of further response, the averments are denied and strict proof is demanded,” the reply to the objections stated, in part.
“It is denied that the cited averments are conclusory. It is also specifically denied that the plaintiff’s averments would allow the plaintiff to amend the complaint to allege new and different theories of negligence after the running of the statute of limitations. Further, the averments contained within the corresponding paragraph are conclusions of law to which no response is required. By way of further response, the averments are denied and strict proof is demanded.”
On Dec. 7, 2023, Lycoming County Court of Common Pleas Judge Eric R. Linhardt partially granted and partially denied the defense’s objections.
“In Connor v. Allegheny General Hospital, our Supreme Court held that a proposed amendment to a complaint in trespass and assumpsit arising out of alleged medical malpractice was not barred by the statute of limitations where the amendment did not add new allegations of negligence based on a different theory, but merely amplified an existing allegation of the original complaint. The Court so held because the right to amend a pleading should be liberally granted at any stage in the proceeding, absent ‘resulting prejudice’ to the adverse party. Thus, an amendment that merely amplifies what has already been averred must be permitted, while an amendment introducing a new cause of action after the statute of limitations has run in favor of the defendant constitutes ‘resulting prejudice’ to the adverse party and must not be allowed. With this in mind, defendants’ concern is that the allegations to which they object could be ‘amplified’ to encompass allegations of negligence not appearing in the complaint,” Linhardt said.
“When reading the complaint as a whole rather than looking at individual allegations independently, the Court finds that the allegations in sub-paragraphs a. (‘Negligently administering the cardiac stress test’), j. (‘Failure to properly manage the plaintiffs cardiac stress test’), k. (‘Failure to ensure the plaintiffs safety during the procedure’), l. (‘Failure to provide adequate supervision during the procedure’), and n. (‘Failure to prevent harm to plaintiff’) are properly supported by the factual allegations made elsewhere in the complaint and, thus, are sufficiently specific. As such, the preliminary objections are denied with respect to those allegations. The Court finds that the remaining allegations that defendant challenges, however, are not supported by the factual allegations in the complaint and therefore, the preliminary objections are sustained with respect to those allegations.”
After an amended complaint was filed on Dec. 20, 2023 subsequent to Linhardt’s ruling, the defendants provided an answer with new matter on Jan. 11.
“There was no negligence or other actionable conduct committed by or on the part of the answering defendants, and plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to state a cause of action against them. Even if it is judicially determined that the answering defendants were negligent, which is specifically denied, no such action was causally related to any injuries and/or damages that plaintiff claims. Any acts and/or omissions of the answering defendants alleged to constitute negligence were not a substantial cause or factor of the subject incident and/or did not result in the injury and/or losses alleged by plaintiff. Plaintiff’s alleged damages/injuries were the result of plaintiff’s underlying medical condition and not due to any alleged negligence by or on behalf of the answering defendants. The alleged injuries and/or damages, if any, were caused by and/or a result of intervening and/or superseding causes,” the new matter stated.
“The incident, injuries and/or damages alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff were not proximately caused by the answering defendants. The alleged injuries and/or damages sustained by plaintiff were caused or contributed to, in whole or in part, by persons or entities other than the answering defendants, and over whom the answering defendants had no control and for whose actions the answering defendants are not liable. The answering defendants raise the bar of all applicable statutes of limitation with respect to any and all causes of action that might be barred thereby. The answering defendants raise all available defenses and limitations on recoverable damages pursuant to the provisions of the MCARE Act. The alleged injuries and/or damages, if any, were caused by and/or a result of intervening and/or superseding causes.”
On Feb. 29, the plaintiff denied the defendants’ new matter in its entirety as conclusions of law to which no official response was required, and repeated that her damages and injuries were caused solely by the defendants’ negligence.
Defendants Dalessandro and Bradley motioned to be dismissed from the case on March 1 per the Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error (MCARE) Act, supported by their affidavits of non-involvement in the subject events at issue.
“Neither Dr. Dalessandro nor PA-C Bradley were involved in or had any obligation to do any of the actions (or inactions) that plaintiff claims were allegedly negligent and caused her fall and shoulder fracture. Rule 1036(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party seeking dismissal of an action based upon an affidavit of non-involvement ‘shall file a motion to dismiss which shall have attached thereto the affidavit of non-involvement.’ The Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error (MCARE) Act of 2002 provides that ‘any health care provider named as a defendant in a medical professional liability action may cause the action against the provider to be dismissed upon the filing of an affidavit of non-involvement with the court. Pursuant to the affidavits of non-involvement of Dr. Dalessandro and PA-C Bradley, and pursuant to 40 P.S. Section 1303.506, neither defendant had any involvement or obligation regarding the care and treatment which plaintiff claims was negligent,” their dismissal motion stated.
“Instead, Dr. Dalessandro’s and PA-C Bradley’s affidavits confirm, the following: a) Their responsibilities on July 24, 2021 were limited to the admission of new patients to UPMC Williamsport; b) Their responsibilities to plaintiff ended when their shifts ended on July 24, 2021; c) Thereafter, plaintiff’s care was assigned to other providers on the hospitalist service; d) They were not present, and had no obligation to be present, for plaintiff’s exercise stress echocardiogram; e) They had no obligation to ensure that safety or fall prevention measures were in place during plaintiff’s exercise stress echocardiogram; f) They had no obligation to provide for the care and treatment of plaintiff during the exercise stress echocardiogram; g) They had no obligation to consult a cardiologist or any other specialty prior to the exercise stress echocardiogram; h) They had no obligation to order any other testing for plaintiff; and, i) The individuals who actually administered the exercise stress echocardiogram to plaintiff were not the servants or employees of either Dr. Dalessandro or PA-C Bradley. Thus, Dr. Dalessandro and PA-C Bradley were not involved in or had any obligation regarding any of the acts, omissions, or conduct that forms the basis of plaintiff's claims asserted in her amended complaint.”
In a March 27 response to the dismissal motion, the plaintiff generally denied the doctors’ averments as “conclusions of law to which no response is required, [and] by way of further response…strict proof is demanded.”
UPDATE
On April 4, Linhardt issued a judicial order announcing a settlement in the case. Terms of the settlement were not disclosed.
“The Court having been informed that the parties have reached a settlement, this case is hereby removed from the Court’s January/February 2026 trial list and the argument on defendants’ motion to dismiss scheduled for April 10, 2024 is cancelled. Plaintiff is ordered and directed to file a praecipe to settle and discontinue within 30 days after entry of this order. Counsel shall notify the Court promptly should more time be required to effectuate the settlement,” Linhardt stated.
The plaintiff was represented by Caroline Munley and Mackenzie E. Wilson of Munley Law, in Scranton.
The defendants were represented by Brian J. Bluth of McCormick Law Firm, in Williamsport.
Lycoming County Court of Common Pleas case CV-2023-00633
From the Pennsylvania Record: Reach Courts Reporter Nicholas Malfitano at nick.malfitano@therecordinc.com