PHILADELPHIA – The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has ruled in favor of a death row inmate who alleged that his being kept in solitary confinement, despite facing severe mental health issues, constituted cruel and unusual punishment – and has remanded his case to a lower federal court for further consideration.
Third Circuit judges Peter J. Phipps, Tamika R. Montgomery-Reeves and Theodore A. McKee handed down such a decision on Sept. 20, with McKee authoring the Court’s opinion in this case.
Williams had previously been convicted of first-degree murder in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, in connection with the shooting death of James P. McDonnell. After the penalty hearing, the jury found one aggravating circumstance, no mitigating circumstances and set the penalty at death.
Williams’ post-verdict motions were argued and denied and the trial court imposed a sentence of death, a sentence upheld on appeal to the Commonwealth Court.
“Roy Lee Williams was held on death row in solitary confinement in the CCU from 1993 to 2019 – 26 years. Astonishingly, he was only subject to an active death warrant for 37 days of those 26 years. Williams’ death warrant is no longer active. His first death warrant was signed on Oct. 11, 1995. His execution was scheduled for Oct. 26, 1995, and stayed on Oct. 20, 1995. His second death warrant was signed on Feb. 2, 1996. His execution was scheduled for Feb. 20, 1996, and stayed on Feb. 12, 1996. His third death warrant was signed on Dec. 20, 2004. His execution was scheduled for Feb. 17, 2005, and stayed on Jan. 7, 2005,” McKee said.
“Williams’ history of serious mental health issues dates back to childhood. In 1979, when Williams was 14, he was involuntarily committed to the Philadelphia Psychiatric Center for making suicidal threats and exhibiting violent behavior. There, he was diagnosed with depression and suicidal ideation. In 1994, while in custody at SCI-Graterford, Williams sought help from the Psychological Services Department because he was deteriorating emotionally. A psychiatrist diagnosed him with a psychiatric disability and placed him on the DOC’s Mental Health Roster, with a ‘C’ designation. At some point during his incarceration, he was downgraded to the ‘B’ Roster. On Dec. 30, 1995, Williams was referred to a psychiatrist at SCI-Graterford due to manifestations of ‘depression and anxiety.’ During an evaluation performed on Jan. 29, 1996, Williams described his psychiatric history of visits to the Philadelphia Psychiatric Center as a young teenager. Mental health staff found that he ‘presented no mental de-compensation or emotional problems.”
However, subsequent medical examination “documented Williams’ brain damage and the resulting ‘impairments and deficiencies’ that neuropsychological testing had revealed,” which included “impaired cognition, emotional lability, and deficiencies in ‘reasoning capacity.”
The evaluation confirmed, according to McKee that Williams was “severely psychologically, cognitively and emotionally impaired”, findings which were shared with the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections.
“Although the Secretary argues that Williams’ placement in solitary confinement was required under Section 4303 of Pennsylvania’s Prison and Parole Code, that statute was not enacted until five years after Williams was placed in solitary confinement. Williams was placed in solitary initially pursuant to the DOC’s internal policy. Section 4303 thereafter mandated that upon receipt of a death warrant, ‘the Secretary [of Corrections] shall, until infliction of the death penalty…keep the [incarcerated person] in solitary confinement,” McKee stated.
“However, where, as here, an inmate’s death warrant expired, it was ‘entirely a matter of the Department’s discretion where to house an inmate.’ Until November 2019, the DOC held individuals with expired death warrants in solitary confinement indefinitely. The DOC only abandoned that policy when it settled a class-action brought on behalf of Capital Case Unit inmates alleging that their CCU conditions violated their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The DOC began implementing changes pursuant to the settlement agreement in December 2019.”
McKee said the conditions of death row solitary confinement have “been well-documented by this Court.”
Before the 2019 settlement agreement, prisoners in the CCU lived in cells no larger than seven feet by 12 feet. They were forced to “spend the overwhelming majority of their time in their cells, including eating their meals alone.”
“They were not allowed to leave their cells for more than 10 hours per week, including for basic hygiene and work duty and were only permitted to exercise in ‘cages…no more than twice the size of a typical CCU cell.’ When permitted to leave their cells, CCU prisoners were ‘handcuffed from behind, or handcuffed in front using a belt and tether’ and they were forced to ‘undergo a visual strip search.’ Their ‘job assignments were limited to janitorial duties on the CCU block, and performed in confined small spaces under close observation and monitoring.’ Prisoners in the CCU were ‘precluded from participation in adult basic education courses, vocational learning opportunities or the chance to work towards a high school diploma’ and were not permitted to attend group religious services,” McKee said.
In 2014, the United States Department of Justice published a comprehensive report, in the form of a letter, following its investigation of the Pennsylvania DOC’s use of solitary confinement on individuals with serious mental illnesses, including individuals placed in the CCU.
The DOJ found that the DOC’s subjection of prisoners with serious mental illness to prolonged periods of solitary confinement was “often unjustifiably harsh and resulted in serious harm” – specifically, that the practice “violated the Eighth Amendment because it: (1) resulted in serious ‘harm or an unreasonable risk of harm,’ (2) interfered with the DOC’s ‘ability to provide adequate mental health treatment,’ and (3) constituted ‘unjustifiably harsh’ and ‘dehumanizing’ conditions.”
Williams then filed a pro se complaint against the Secretary, asserting Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, and a claim under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.
Williams requested nominal, compensatory and punitive damages under the Eighth Amendment and the ADA based upon his continued placement in solitary confinement “in light of his history of depression and suicidal ideation.”
“The District Court sua sponte dismissed Williams’ Fourteenth Amendment claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Thereafter, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the District Court granted. The District Court determined that, pursuant to Porter v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, the Secretary was entitled to qualified immunity on Williams’ Eighth Amendment claim. The District Court also granted summary judgment on Williams’ ADA claim. It determined that, although there was a factual dispute as to whether Williams had a disability under the ADA, he could not establish the intentional discrimination necessary to obtain compensatory damages,” McKee stated.
“Williams argues that the Secretary was not entitled to qualified immunity from Williams’ Eighth Amendment allegations. He contends that the Secretary should have known that continuing to hold someone with his mental and medical history in solitary confinement violated a clearly established right. Defendants, on the other hand, dispute whether the Secretary had adequate notice to defeat the shield of qualified immunity, as well as whether the Secretary knew of Williams’ mental problems. Williams further argues that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment on his ADA claim. Finally, Williams argues that the District Court erred when, pursuant to Section 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii), it sua sponte dismissed with prejudice his Fourteenth Amendment claim for failure to state a claim.”
McKee then spoke on behalf of the Court, and found Williams had put forth a successful argument.
“Our review of the District Court’s decision requires us to draw all reasonable inferences in Williams’ favor, including that the Secretary had knowledge of Williams’ pre-existing serious mental illness. We must then determine if the Secretary should have known that holding this death-row prisoner with pre-existing serious mental illness in solitary confinement from 1993 to 2019 without penological justification violated the Eighth Amendment,” McKee said.
“We conclude that the Secretary had ‘fair and clear warning’ that his conduct was unconstitutional and should have known that keeping Williams in solitary confinement would constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Therefore, the doctrine of qualified immunity does not shield the Secretary from Williams’ Eighth Amendment claim. Our prior precedents and the record before us leave no room for doubt that it has long been clearly established that someone with a known pre-existing serious mental illness has a constitutional right not to be held – without penological justification – in prolonged solitary confinement.”
McKee and his colleagues also addressed Williams’ ADA claim.
“As to Williams’ Title II ADA claim, the District Court correctly determined that there was a material factual dispute as to whether the DOC knew that Williams had a serious mental illness. However, the court erroneously concluded that a trier of fact could not find that the DOC was deliberately indifferent to the risk of harm it caused by placing and keeping Williams in solitary confinement despite his pre-existing serious mental illness,” McKee stated.
“Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on both claims and remand for further proceedings. We will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Williams’ Fourteenth Amendment claim.”
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit case 22-2399
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania case 2:21-cv-01248
From the Pennsylvania Record: Reach Courts Reporter Nicholas Malfitano at nick.malfitano@therecordinc.com