PITTSBURGH – A federal judge has denied motions for partial summary judgment and to sever claims from Pittsburgh Regional Transit, with respect to a class action brought against it by former employees who unsuccessfully submitted religious or medical exemptions for the COVID-19 vaccine, and were later fired.
John Doe(s) and Jane Doe(s) (on behalf of themselves and others similarly-situated) first filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania on Dec. 6, 2022 versus Pittsburgh Regional Transit (formerly known as the Port Authority of Allegheny County).
(At the present time, Jacob Meinert, serves as Class Representative on behalf of those plaintiffs who submitted a religious exemption and were fired, and Nicholas Schallus serves as Class Representative on behalf of those plaintiffs who submitted a medical exemption and were fired.)
“Plaintiffs filed a third amended class action complaint against defendant on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, alleging that implementation of defendant’s COVID-19 Mandatory Vaccination Policy violated state and federal law. The following facts, as alleged in plaintiffs’ third amended complaint, are relevant to the Court’s consideration of the motions at issue: Defendant is a Pennsylvania public authority responsible for providing public transportation in Allegheny County. Plaintiffs are former employees of defendant who ‘were bus drivers or maintenance workers of various types who [had] sincerely-held religious beliefs against receiving the COVID-19 vaccination,” U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania Judge Robert J. Colville said.
“In January of 2022, ‘defendant announced that all employees must receive a COVID-19 vaccination by March 15, 2022 or face discipline up to and including termination.’ Plaintiffs submitted religious and/or medical exemptions to the COVID-19 vaccination mandate. ‘Defendant denied all or virtually all exemption requests it received, regardless of merit.’ As a result, plaintiffs’ employment was terminated.”
On Dec. 28, 2023, the plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment. The plaintiffs argued that “the defendant admitted to the sincerity of plaintiffs’ religious beliefs in various statements and, as a result, defendant should be prevented from arguing otherwise under the doctrines of waiver, estoppel and/or forfeiture.”
“Specifically, plaintiffs rely on pre-litigation statements made during their exemption process that defendant was not questioning the sincerity or validity of plaintiffs’ religious beliefs when denying plaintiffs’ religious exemptions. Additionally, the plaintiffs rely on similar post litigation statements made by defendant’s chief legal officer in arbitration proceedings, in a separate matter. Lastly, plaintiffs rely on a discovery response from defendant in which defendant stated that it did not have any documents to dispute the sincerity of plaintiffs’ religious beliefs,” Colville said.
“Defendant does not deny that these pre-litigation statements were made, but argues that these pre-litigation statements do not entitle plaintiffs to summary judgment. Additionally, defendant argues that it at no time conceded plaintiffs’ religious sincerity or waived its ability to argue against the sincerity of plaintiffs’ religious beliefs during litigation. Defendant argues that it required plaintiffs to submit evidence of their religious beliefs in support of their exemption requests and that defendant reviewed this information when determining whether to grant plaintiffs’ exemption. Additionally, defendant argues that it sent pre-litigation communications to plaintiffs’ attorney explaining that while the sincerity of plaintiffs’ religious beliefs was not being questioned for exemption purposes, defendant was reserving the right to revisit the issue later if need be.”
Colville concurred with the defense and ruled that the summary judgment motion was inapplicable.
“Defendant is correct that plaintiffs are not entitled to summary judgment on this issue. In support of its argument, defendant points the Court to Gallo v. Washington Nationals Baseball Club, LLC, in which the District Court for the District of Columbia denied the plaintiff’s partial motion for summary judgment brought under the exact same circumstances. In Gallo, the plaintiff, like the plaintiffs here, sought partial summary judgment ‘on the issue of whether plaintiff’s inability to receive a COVID-19 vaccination was based on a sincerely-held religious belief.’ The plaintiff sought summary judgment based on pre-litigation statements made by defendant’s in-house counsel that the company recognized the plaintiff’s religious beliefs during the exemption process and did not dispute the plaintiff’s religious beliefs,” Colville said.
“In Gallo, the Court denied plaintiff’s motion finding that plaintiff had not pointed the Court to any case law to support the ‘novel proposition that pre-litigation statements of a party as to an element of a claim can foreclose a party from contesting that element in litigation.’ Additionally, the Gallo Court denied the plaintiff’s motion on the basis that there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the defendant had conceded the sincerity of the plaintiff’s religious beliefs. Here, like in Gallo, plaintiffs have not identified any authority by which the Court could find that a defendant’s pre-litigation statements prevent the defendant from contesting an element of the case that the plaintiffs themselves must prove. This alone is reason to deny their motion.”
Meanwhile, on Jan. 11, 2024, the defendant filed a motion to sever claims from the case. It argued that the claims of Meinert and Schallus should be separated pursuant to Rule 20 because “their claims do not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence and do not involve the same questions of law or fact” – but the plaintiffs contended that “both of their claims arise as a result of defendant’s vaccine mandate and that plaintiffs were subject to the same review committee.”
However, Colville again ruled against this pending motion.
“The Court agrees with plaintiffs, at this juncture, that their claims arise out of the same transactions or occurrence and involve common questions of fact. Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence because their claims both arose as a result of defendant’s vaccination mandate, and they were both subject to termination as a result of that mandate. Additionally, while the legal elements plaintiffs must prove for their discrimination claims differ, there are common questions of fact between their claims. When proving commonality, ‘plaintiffs only need to share a single question of law or fact to meet this ‘very low threshold,” Colville said.
“Here, at this early stage of litigation, the Court finds that there are common questions of fact between plaintiffs’ claims. For example, both plaintiffs raise questions as to what defendant’s exemption process entails and whether defendant properly evaluated their exemption requests. Additionally, at this early stage, the Court understands that there will be an overlap in witnesses in this matter. As such, defendant’s motion to sever will be denied, without prejudice.”
The plaintiffs are represented by James L. Welsh III of WK Law, in Murrysville.
The defendant is represented by John J. Myers and William S. Myers of Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott, in Pittsburgh.
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania case 2:22-cv-01736
From the Pennsylvania Record: Reach Courts Reporter Nicholas Malfitano at nick.malfitano@therecordinc.com