HARRISBURG – The Superior Court of Pennsylvania has transferred an appeal surrounding a personal injury complaint against Norfolk Southern Railway Company to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, finding that only it had proper jurisdiction to consider the appeal.
On Sept. 18, 2017, Mallory commenced this action against Norfolk Southern Railway Company, alleging a violation of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. Sections 51-60.
The complaint alleged that Mallory worked for Norfolk Southern as a carman in Ohio and Virginia from 1988 through 2005, but that his employment with the company exposed him to harmful carcinogens which caused him to develop colon cancer.
Norfolk Southern filed preliminary objections seeking dismissal of the complaint due to lack of personal jurisdiction, while Mallory countered that the company consented to jurisdiction by registering in Pennsylvania as a foreign corporation.
Holding that Section 5301(a)(2)(ii) is unconstitutional and does not serve as a basis for exercising jurisdiction over Norfolk Southern, the trial court sustained the company’s preliminary objections and dismissed the complaint on Feb. 6, 2018.
The decision led Mallory to file a timely appeal to the Superior Court, arguing the trial court erred in finding it lacked personal jurisdiction over Norfolk Southern, because Section 5301(a)(2)(ii) confers general jurisdiction by consent over any corporation who registers to do business in Pennsylvania
“The court filed a Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure 1925 opinion in which it concluded that Section 5301(a)(2)(ii) was unconstitutional. The court noted that Pennsylvania law requires foreign corporations to register with the Commonwealth before doing business in Pennsylvania,” Stabile said.
“Construed together with Section 5301, these statutes mandate foreign corporations to submit to the court’s general jurisdiction as a condition for doing business in Pennsylvania. The court held that this statutory regime of ‘forcing foreign corporations to choose between consenting to general jurisdiction in Pennsylvania or foregoing the opportunity to conduct business in Pennsylvania’ violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”
In the appeal, the appellant claims that the trial court was mistaken when it found Section 5301(a)(2)(ii) unconstitutional and Stabile said the first question to examine was whether the Court found it necessary to inquire whether it had proper subject matter jurisdiction.
“The Judiciary Code prescribes that our Supreme Court ‘shall have exclusive jurisdiction of appeals from final orders of the courts of common pleas’ that hold any Pennsylvania statute ‘repugnant to the Constitution…of the United States,” Stabile stated.
“The present appeal is from a final order declaring the consent provision of Pennsylvania’s general jurisdiction statute, Section 5301(a)(2)(ii), unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. The plain language of Section 722(7) mandates that the Supreme Court decide this appeal, not the Superior Court. Pursuant to Section 5103(a), we direct the prothonotary to transfer the record in this case to the Supreme Court.”
As a result, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania will hear further proceedings in the action and per Stabile, Nichols did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
Superior County of Pennsylvania case 802 EDA 2018
Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas case 170901961
From the Pennsylvania Record: Reach Courts Reporter Nicholas Malfitano at nick.malfitano@therecordinc.com