PHILADELPHIA – Pennsylvania State Police authorities have won dismissal of multiple claims made by a Bucks County couple, who alleged the husband-plaintiff was mistakenly arrested for possession of marijuana and incarcerated for five hours, before the authorities dropped all charges and released him.
Edward Capaldo and Natosha Capaldo of Quakertown first filed suit in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas on March 7 versus The Pennsylvania State Police and Pennsylvania State Police Officer Kyle Yeager of Perkasie, plus Doe Officer Defendants 1-10.
“On Nov. 16, 2020 at approximately 9:30 a.m., plaintiff Edward Capaldo was operating his motor vehicle, when a Pennsylvania State Police vehicle ordered him to pull his vehicle into the parking lot of McDonald’s, located at 2 North West End Boulevard, Quakertown, PA. During the course of the stop, defendant Yeager stated he smelled marijuana and further advised plaintiff was operating his vehicle with a suspended license. Plaintiff was not in possession of marijuana,” the suit said.
“Defendant Yeager subsequently opened the door and ripped plaintiff from the vehicle, pushed him and slammed him to the ground. Defendant Yeager also called for back-up and three additional vehicles arrived at the scene. Plaintiff was then detained and transported to the Barracks for allegedly driving with a suspended license. Plaintiff was forced to sit in the State Police barracks for five hours.”
The suit added the plaintiff was fingerprinted, had his mug shot taken and at the end of five hours, the plaintiff was released and all charges were dropped.
“As a direct and proximate result of the acts and conduct of defendants as set forth herein, plaintiff suffered severe and permanent injuries including injury and chronic pain and suffered injuries including numbness in his left arm, injury to his left shoulder, left wrist and severe pain in his neck and lower back all of which caused him and will in the future cause great pain and agony, and has prevented plaintiff and will in the future prevent him from attending to his daily duties to his great financial loss and damage. As a direct and proximate result of the acts and conduct of defendants as set forth herein, the plaintiff has been compelled, in order to effectuate a cure for the aforesaid injuries, to expend large sums of money for medicine and medical attention and may be required to expend additional sums for the same purpose in the future,” the suit stated.
“As a direct and proximate result of the acts and conduct of defendant as set forth herein, the plaintiff has been prevented from attending to his usual daily activities and duties, and may be so prevented for an indefinite period of time in the future, all to his great detriment and loss. As a direct and proximate result of the acts and conduct of defendant as set forth herein, the plaintiff has suffered physical pain and mental anguish and humiliation and may continue to suffer same for an indefinite period of time in the future. As a direct and proximate result of the acts and conduct of defendant as set forth herein, plaintiff has sustained the loss of liberty and severe emotional distress.”
The defendants removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on April 4 and filed a motion to dismiss the case, but that was thrown out by Judge Joshua D. Wolson.
“It is ordered that defendants Pennsylvania State Police and Officer Kyle Yeager’s motion to dismiss is stricken for failure to comply with the meet and confer requirement set forth in Section II.B.4 of [my] Policies and Procedures. Defendants are granted leave to comply with this requirement and re-file a motion to dismiss, if necessary, on or before April 17, 2023,” Wolson said.
After the filing of an amended complaint on May 26, the defendants refiled their dismissal motion on June 2 – where they argued to dismiss all claims from the case, except the lone count against Yeager in his individual capacity, Count III.
“Plaintiff brings claim for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment against Trooper Yeager. But as discovery will show, Trooper Yeager did not use excessive force in his encounter with plaintiff, instead only using force reasonable under the circumstances. At this stage before discovery begins, however, a number of claims in the amended complaint should be dismissed because they are inconsistent with black-letter law and sovereign immunity,” the motion stated.
“First, as a matter of statutory law, neither the State Police nor Trooper Yeager in his official capacity is a ‘person’ under Section 1983, and thus, the statute does not recognize any cause of action against them. For this reason, Count III should be dismissed as to State Police and dismissed to the extent that it purports to state a claim against Trooper Yeager in his official capacity. Second, sovereign immunity bars the common law claims against State Police, as an agency of the Commonwealth. Pennsylvania has not waived sovereign immunity for claims of failure to train and failure to supervise, and there are no exceptions for these negligence claims alleged against State Police. With no state law claims remaining against the State, and no state law claims alleged against Trooper Yeager, plaintiffs’ loss of consortium, a derivative claim, should also be dismissed. As a matter of Pennsylvania law, Counts I, II, IV and V should be dismissed. Third, Pennsylvania does not recognize a cause of action for damages arising out of alleged violations of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Count VI should be dismissed.”
UPDATE
Wolson granted the dismissal motion on July 5, which strips the complaint of nearly all of the plaintiffs’ claims.
“Mr. Capaldo asserts claims against the Pennsylvania State Police, which he alleges is ‘a Commonwealth agency.’ As a Commonwealth Agency, the State Police is not a ‘person’ under Section 1983, so Mr. Capaldo cannot pursue claims against it. For the same reason, Mr. Capaldo cannot assert claims against Trooper Yeager in his official capacity because those claims are really just claims against the State Police under Section 1983. The Capaldos’ argument that defendants waived Eleventh Immunity does not save these claims because it misses the point. Even if defendants have waived their immunity from suit, they have not altered the scope of Section 1983 just by removing the case to this Court. Mr. Capaldo does not address this issue, nor would he have a meritorious argument in any event. Therefore, I will dismiss the claims in Counts I and II in their entirety and Count III to the extent they assert official capacity claims. Count II is a claim for vicarious liability under Section 1983, but it has been the law for 45 years that no such claim exists,” Wolson said.
“The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and its officials and employees acting within the scope of their duties enjoy sovereign immunity, unless the Pennsylvania General Assembly makes an explicit waiver. The General Assembly has enumerated ten exceptions to Pennsylvania’s sovereign immunity statute, but none of them applies here. To the extent that Mr. Capaldo asserts state law claims in Count II of the complaint (and it’s not clear if he does), those claims appear to arise from a theory of negligence. The General Assembly has not waived sovereign immunity for negligence, so the claims cannot proceed. The Capaldos’ efforts to save these claims are wrong, irrelevant, or both. First, Congress cannot abridge a state’s sovereign immunity for state law claims. The Pennsylvania General Assembly, not Congress, defines the scope of sovereign immunity with respect to suits under Pennsylvania law. Second, voluntary removal to federal court does not waive the sovereign immunity defense provided by state law. Mr. Capaldo concedes that he cannot maintain claims under the Pennsylvania Constitution, and he’s right, so I will dismiss those claims. Finally, Mrs. Capaldo’s loss of consortium claim fails because it is derivative of Mr. Capaldo’s state law claims, and those claims fail.”
Wolson concluded by ordering that the defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s amended complaint is granted. Counts I, II, IV and V are dismissed with prejudice in their entirety. Count III is dismissed with prejudice to the extent it asserts claims against Trooper Yeager or any John Doe defendant in his or her official capacity.
For counts of assault and battery, false imprisonment, failure to train and supervise, vicarious liability, civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, Pennsylvania Constitution violations under Article I, Section 8 and loss of consortium, the plaintiffs are seeking compensatory and punitive damages in excess of $50,000.
The plaintiffs are represented by James R. Radmore of the Law Office of James R. Radmore, in Philadelphia.
The defendants are represented by Sarina M. Kaplan of the Pennsylvania Attorney General’s Office, in Philadelphia.
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania case 2:23-cv-01287
Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas case 221101580
From the Pennsylvania Record: Reach Courts Reporter Nicholas Malfitano at nick.malfitano@therecordinc.com