PITTSBURGH – Lyft is seeking to open and/or strike a default judgment entered against in a case brought by the son and daughter of a 55-year-old man shot to death last August, in the parking lot of a Sheetz convenience store by his driver from the ride share company.
Tiffani Angel and John Angel Jr. (as Co-Administrators of the Estate of John R. Angel Sr., decedent) filed suit in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas on March 23 versus Lyft, Inc. of San Francisco, Calif. and Benjamin Cartwright of Pittsburgh.
“The decedent, John R. Angel Sr. died on Aug. 11, 2022. Tiffani Angel and John Angel Jr. are the daughter and son, respectively, of the decedent. The events giving rise to this lawsuit occurred on or about Aug. 11, 2022 at approximately 10:46 p.m. at a Sheetz store located at 3457 William Penn Highway, Pittsburgh, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania 15235,” the suit said.
“On Aug. 11, 2022, and for some period of time prior thereto, defendant Cartwright, was employed by and/or an agent of defendant Lyft as a Lyft driver, displaying on his vehicle one or more Lyft placards and/or signs. At all times relevant hereto, the work performed by defendant Cartwright was part of Lyft’s regular business.”
The suit added that Lyft had a policy and/or procedure which was in effect on and before Aug. 11, 2022 prohibiting its drivers from possessing or carrying firearms while performing their duties as Lyft drivers.
“On Aug. 11, 2022, defendant Cartwright, in his capacity as an employee, agent and driver for Lyft, picked up John R. Angel, Sr., from a bar in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. The defendant Lyft driver Cartwright, was supposed to transport decedent to his place of residence in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. Instead of driving the decedent to his residence, the Lyft driver Cartwright proceeded into a Sheetz parking lot located at 3457 William Penn Highway in Wilkins Township, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. The Sheetz parking lot was not the destination intended for the Lyft trip. After the Lyft vehicle was driven into the Sheetz parking lot by defendant Cartwright, both the decedent and defendant Cartwright exited the vehicle,” the suit stated.
“At all times relevant hereto, defendant Cartwright was acting within the course and scope of his employment and/or agency by Lyft as a Lyft driver immediately before and at the time of the incident giving rise to this complaint and was at all times relevant hereto furthering the business of Lyft. At all times relevant hereto, Lyft was acting by and through its agents, servants, and employees, including Cartwright, who were acting within the course and scope of their employment and agency and on the business of Lyft. At all times relevant hereto, the decedent, John R. Angel, Sr., was not carrying a firearm. At all times relevant hereto, defendant Cartwright, was carrying a firearm. While in the Sheetz parking lot, defendant Cartwright fired his gun at the decedent, causing injuries which led to John R. Angel Sr.’s death.”
On June 26, defendant Cartwright filed an answer, new matter and cross-claim in the case, where he generally denied the plaintiffs’ allegations and asserted that his action to shoot Angel Sr. was only chosen in self-defense.
“Mr. Cartwright is without information to ascertain the veracity of plaintiffs’ statement that the decedent was to be transported to his residence, as he was only provided a street address. It is admitted that the Sheetz address was not the address provided by Mr. Angel. However, due to the behaviors and action of Mr. Angel while in the vehicle of Mr. Cartwright, it was necessary for Mr. Cartwright to find an open and safe public location to terminate the ride share. It is admitted that both parties exited the vehicle. However, Mr. Angel refused to vacate the vehicle after being requested to do so and was drunk and belligerent to Mr. Cartwright. It is admitted that Mr. Cartwright fired his gun at Mr. Angel in self-defense,” the answer stated, in part.
“Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff’s claims fail to fall within the applicable statute of limitations. Plaintiff’s claims are limited and/or barred by the doctrine of Comparative and/or Contributory Negligence. Plaintiff’s claims are barred as the decedent was the aggressor at all relevant times. Plaintiff’s claims are barred, and plaintiff is precluded from recovering amounts already paid or paid from other sources. Plaintiff’s claims are barred due to the doctrine of justification. Plaintiff’s claims are barred by estoppel. Plaintiff’s claims are barred by privilege. Plaintiff’s claims are barred by self-defense. Plaintiff’s claims are barred by duress. Plaintiff’s claims are barred by necessity.”
Through a cross-claim, Cartwright redirected liability for the events in question to Lyft.
Plaintiff counsel filed a praecipe for entry of default judgment against Lyft on July 20, as they had not responded to the complaint to this point.
“Please enter a judgment against defendant Lyft, Inc., for failure to file a response to the complaint served upon them. I certify that a written notice of intention to file this praecipe was mailed to the defendant via regular mail and certified mail after the default had occurred and at least 10 days prior to the date of the filing of this praecipe,” the praecipe stated.
The default judgment was entered against Lyft by the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas on July 26.
UPDATE
Lyft then filed a petition to strike the judgment on Aug. 7, claiming that it had not been properly served with the complaint – or open the judgment, due to the company having a meritorious defense.
“Lyft was never properly served with the complaint, so the default judgment entered against it should be stricken. Lyft did not receive the complaint because plaintiffs mailed it to the wrong address. Plaintiffs’ proof of service further corroborates that Lyft did not receive the complaint because the return receipt does not have a signature, printed name of the person who received the complaint, or date of delivery. Without a signature or date, there is no evidence that Lyft was served with, and thus had notice of, the complaint. In the absence of proper service, the default judgment entered against Lyft is void and must be stricken,” the petition stated.
“First, attached to this petition is a copy of the complaint and Lyft’s proposed preliminary objections. Second, this petition is being timely filed, having been filed within 10 days after entry of the default judgment, which was entered on July 26, 2023. Lyft’s proposed preliminary objections state a meritorious defense. First, Lyft asserts a preliminary objection pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1028(a)(1) for improper service on Lyft. As set forth above and in the attached preliminary objections, plaintiff attempted to serve Lyft, a corporation, via certified mail at the wrong address. In or about November 2022, Lyft’s principal business address changed to 185 Berry Street, Suite 400, San Francisco, CA 94107. This change was reflected in documents which are publicly available through the California Secretary of State. There is no indication that either the complaint or the 10-day notice was ever delivered to Lyft at the correct address.”
Additionally, Lyft said that the plaintiffs’ claims were improperly pled and their request for punitive damages against the company should be stricken, because the complaint “fails to allege sufficient facts to meet the extraordinarily high standard to recover this type of damages.”
“Finally, even if Lyft’s preliminary objections are denied, it has a meritorious defense to the complaint because the facts and law underlying these objections would similarly preclude plaintiffs’ recovery at summary judgment or at trial. Unless this Court opens the default judgment, Lyft will be deprived of its right to defend itself in this case – a case that Lyft intends to defend aggressively because it believes plaintiffs’ claims against it lack merit,” the petition continued.
For counts of survival and wrongful death, the plaintiffs are seeking compensatory and punitive damages in excess of the arbitration limits, plus costs, interest and other relief permitted by the Court.
The plaintiffs are represented by Kenneth J. Nolan of Phil DiLucente & Associates, in Pittsburgh.
The defendants are represented by Jeffrey D. Ries of the Law Firm of Jeffrey Dallas Ries in North Huntingdon, plus Courtney S. Schorr, Branden P. Moore and Cameron J. Comer of McGuire Woods, in Pittsburgh.
Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas case GD-23-004172
From the Pennsylvania Record: Reach Courts Reporter Nicholas Malfitano at nick.malfitano@therecordinc.com