PHILADELPHIA – A Pennsylvania man who alleged he was fired from his role as a senior executive with pharmaceutical company AstraZeneca, because he refused to take the COVID-19 vaccine and was denied an exemption for religious reasons, has seen a federal judge dismiss his case.
Matthew Mullen first filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on Oct. 8 versus AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals, LP, of Bensalem.
“Plaintiff worked with the defendant from December 2004 to April 29, 2022, when plaintiff was terminated. His position upon termination was Senior Business Relationship Manager, IT Market Access. During his employment, plaintiff was never formerly disciplined. On or about Feb. 22, 2022, plaintiff completed defendant’s Religious Reasonable Accommodation Request Form to seek an exemption from the COVID-19 Vaccine after receiving a notice from the defendant which stated that all employees must take the vaccine unless they were exempted due to religion or disability,” the suit stated.
“Since the beginning of the pandemic, plaintiff had worked remotely and when he was in the office he followed the defendant’s protocols for weekly testing. On or about March 21, 2022, defendant requested additional information from plaintiff. On or about March 25, 2022, plaintiff provided additional answers to defendant’s additional questions about his religious beliefs. On or about March 31, 2022, defendant denied plaintiff’s request to receive accommodation from the vaccine, claiming that the plaintiff failed to articulate a sincerely-held religious belief.”
The suit continued that a follow-up email conversation between the plaintiff and defendant ultimately didn’t resolve the stalemate, and the April 22, 2022 deadline for the plaintiff to receive the vaccine came and went. Ultimately, the plaintiff was terminated one week later, on April 29, 2022.
“On or about Aug. 1, 2022, plaintiff started working as Digital Lead – Market Access US for Bayer at a reduced salary. Plaintiff also now receives a reduced bonus package of $13,000, compared to the $80,000 he was receiving while employed with the defendant. Plaintiff lost approximately $90,000 in stock, which had not vested at the time defendant terminated his position. Plaintiff only receives a 5% 401K match on 7% at Bayer, compared to the 6% match on 6% at AstraZeneca, plus they had given the plaintiff another 6% match since plaintiff was there so long. Plaintiff now only receives an additional 5% from Bayer, which vests every four years,” the suit said.
“Plaintiff now drives approximately three hours every other week to Bayer and now must pay tolls. This has caused plaintiff much higher stress as it is highways and traffic compared to no tolls and back roads which he used to travel while working with defendant. Plaintiff may have to relocate to New Jersey where house prices and taxes are 3-4 times what they are where he now lives, plus moving expenses (a similar house with similar land would cost $1.5 million compared to $400,000 – $500,000). Plaintiff, as the main breadwinner in his household, also experienced stress over the months in which he was unemployed. His wife only works part-time and makes significantly less than he does. Further, plaintiff had to pay out of pocket for him and his family’s health insurance while he was unemployed. Plaintiff’s professional career and reputation have also been impaired.”
The plaintiff believed the company’s conduct violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act.
In a Dec. 8 motion to dismiss the complaint in its entirety, counsel for AstraZeneca maintained that, among other arguments, the plaintiff had not showed he faced religious discrimination or retaliation under either federal or state law.
“Plaintiff cannot satisfy the pleading standards for failure to accommodate-based religious discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or under the Pennsylvania Human Relation Act because he has not sufficiently alleged that he has a sincerely held religious belief that conflicted with AZ’s requirement that its employees be vaccinated against COVID-19 or communicated such a belief to AZ. Plaintiff cannot satisfy the pleading standards for disparate treatment-based religious discrimination under Title VII or the PHRA because he has not sufficiently alleged that any AZ employee outside his protected category was treated more favorably than he was or that his termination occurred under any circumstances giving rise to an inference of religious discrimination,” per the defense’s motion.
“Finally, plaintiff cannot satisfy the pleading standards for retaliation under Title VII or the PHRA because he has not sufficiently alleged that he engaged in protected activity, and because even if he had engaged in protected activity, he has not sufficiently alleged that AZ terminated his employment because of any purported protected activity.”
UPDATE
On Dec. 14, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania Judge John M. Younge granted the defense’s motion and dismissed the plaintiff’s case without leave to amend.
Younge found that the plaintiff’s “failure to inform defendant of an articulable conflict between the defendant’s COVID-19 vaccination policy and a sincerely-held religious belief that supports his opposition to and need for accommodation from defendant’s policy, is fatal to his claim.”
Younge added that the plaintiff merely showed “a preference against, rather than a religiously-based opposition to, receiving the vaccine.”
“Plaintiff requested a religious accommodation rooted in a broadly-articulated religious belief that could form the basis of virtually any professed conflict if so liberally construed. Defendant twice attempted to understand the basis for plaintiff’s objections, through the initial request form and a request for additional information, but much of plaintiff’s responses were, in fact, largely non-responsive to defendant’s efforts. This Court does not question the sincerity of plaintiff’s religious beliefs, nor is it necessary to for the purposes of addressing defendant’s motion. It remains that the plaintiff identified no religious belief to the defendant that prevented his taking the vaccine and, thus, defendant did not violate Title VII by not providing an accommodation,” Younge said.
“Plaintiff spends significant time in his complaint outlining why other accommodations protecting against the spread of COVID-19 would have been reasonable, particularly in comparison to receiving the vaccine. However, plaintiff’s concerns about the efficacy of the vaccine are non-religious in nature and do not alter the Court’s determination that plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege a prima facie case for failure to provide a religious accommodation. Accordingly, defendant’s denial of plaintiff’s request for a religious accommodation does not amount to a violation of Title VII.”
Younge continued that Mullen had not shown facts displaying evidence of disparate treatment or that would support a prima facie case for religious retaliation, which also led him to grant the defense’s dismissal motion.
“Defendant’s motion to dismiss as to plaintiff’s disparate treatment claims must be
granted, as plaintiff presents no facts suggesting that others were treated more favorably than him because of his religious beliefs. Under Title VII, a religious discrimination claim based on disparate treatment requires the plaintiff to show that “(1) [They] are a member of a protected class; (2) [They] were qualified for the position [they] sought; (3) [They] suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) The action occurred under circumstances that could give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination. Plaintiff does not identify any difference in treatment between him and his former colleagues other than that some employees of various unidentified faiths received a religious accommodation while his request for a religious accommodation – which, as noted previously, was inadequate – was denied. These alleged facts do not support a plausible claim for relief,” Younge stated.
“Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that his termination was connected to protected activity. To bring a retaliation claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must show ‘(1) That [they] engaged in a protected activity; (2) There was an adverse action by the employer either after or contemporaneous with the employee’s protected activity; and (3) A causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.’ Plaintiff cannot causally connect this activity – including his April 20, 2022 letter stating that he believes he should be provided a religious accommodation, which is his only act that could be construed as opposition – to his termination. Instead, the basis for his termination was conveyed to plaintiff and his former colleagues prior to plaintiff’s request for a religious accommodation: The defendant implemented a mandatory vaccination policy for all persons not afforded a religious or disability accommodation, and non-compliance by a specified deadline would result in termination. Plaintiff’s termination was not a retaliatory response to plaintiff applying for a religious accommodation – it was the foretold consequence of non-compliance absent an approved accommodation.”
Younge also disagreed with the notion that the defendant company “requesting information as to the basis of an employee’s religious objection to a company policy” was retaliatory, and instead characterized it as “part of an employer’s obligations under Title VII.”
“Plaintiff additionally makes several conclusory allegations regarding defendant’s motive in conducting this process and denying his application, including that the defendant wanted the plaintiff to abandon his religious beliefs, wanted to purge unvaccinated religious employees from its company, and wanted to coerce religious employees to be vaccinated. Mere conclusory statements, such as these, will not sustain a claim that was otherwise insufficiently alleged. As such, the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that he was subjected to retaliation in violation of Title VII,” Younge said.
The plaintiff was represented by Charles J. Hobbs of Hobbs & Hunter in York, Jesse C. Markley of Markley Law Firm in Middletown and Jeremy Alan Donham of Donham Law, in Morgantown, W.Va.
The defendant was represented by Sarah E. Bouchard and Daniel A. Kadish of Morgan Lewis & Bockius, in both Philadelphia and New York, N.Y.
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania case 2:23-cv-03903
From the Pennsylvania Record: Reach Courts Reporter Nicholas Malfitano at nick.malfitano@therecordinc.com